THE

MODERN CHURCHMAN

By identifying the new learning with heresy, you make orthodoxy synonymous with ignorance.—*Erasmus.*
A State without the means of change is without the means of its conservation.—*Edmund Burke.*

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THE GOSPEL AND MODERN LIFE*

By Sir William Ashley, Ph.D.

THAT men should desire the improvement of human society is dictated by a sense of common humanity, by natural sympathy and by a true social philosophy. But the operation of these motives is impeded and stinted by thoughtlessness, by sheer self-seeking, and by the philosophy, whether unselfishly or selfishly entertained, of 'the struggle for existence.' It is, therefore, the immeasurably important function of Christianity to supply the additional stimulus of its own characteristic teaching. Without the conscious help of that Christian inspiration, and indeed honestly thinking that it is ill-founded or useless or even harmful, there are men and women—let us hasten to recognize it—who do, in fact, labour for the common good and sacrifice themselves for others. They are like him, of whom our Lord told us, who said 'I will not,' but 'went.' The condemnation is all the greater of those who 'profess and call themselves Christians,' who say 'I go' and go not. The Christian ideal is that we should do our social duty, and do it with the hope and patience drawn from the Christian message.

The followers of Jesus cannot be in doubt as to His teaching. It is summed up in two words: 'love' and the 'kingdom.' It is the first task of the modern Church to 'depolarize' these words,

* Speech at the *Universal Christian Conference on Life and Work*, Stockholm. August 20, 1925.

in Oliver Wendell Holmes' phrase; to create a fresh movement of thought by the use of equivalents in the language of to-day. Let me try, imperfectly and briefly, to do so. By 'love'—wherein for the Christian all moral duty is summed up—is meant a sincere and therefore active desire for the highest well-being of others. By the 'gospel of the kingdom' we mean the conviction that there is a Divine Purpose at work in the world with which we are called upon to co-operate, and that the ideal goal of that purpose is a human society worthy of man's capabilities.

That these thoughts should really influence our own conduct implies their victory over the lower and immediate self. The purpose of Christian worship is to put us into such an attitude towards the Source from which we come and towards our fellow-men that the narrow and selfish self may recede and a new self come to the front. The 'change of mind,' the 'repentance,' which this involves may mark some crisis of our lives; or, as with most of us, it may be a repeated readjustment, a repeated return to lost ground. In either case, it is the Christian will which has to be created or strengthened. That is the primary requirement. But how this will is to operate, what sort of machinery this motive power is to drive along—that involves problems which call for all the lessons of the world's experience, all the insight we can gain into human psychology. The place of the Christian preacher is, as I have said, to awaken the will: he cannot be blamed if he does not, from the pulpit, try to set forth precisely the political measures or the personal actions in which it shall realise itself. Indeed, it is better that he should not attempt to. But it must be confessed that preachers have very commonly shown the opposite failing; and have spoken as if the translation of will into action were more direct and immediate and simple than it can usefully be in a complex society. It is too often forgotten that our religion should be a religion of the head as well as of the heart; that it calls for 'all our mind.'

The bearing of this thought on 'the new commandment' of 'love' is already implied in the paraphrase: 'a sincere desire for the highest well-being of others.' The intelligent Christian is bound to judge of the value of an action, not alone by the character of the emotion from which it proceeds, but also by its effect on those towards whom it is directed.

When new economic conditions caused the nations of Western Europe in the sixteenth century to create systems of public poor relief, the Sorbonne, the highest theological court of appeal, was called upon to consider whether it was right to impose any restrictions on mendicancy. On the negative side it was urged that to do so would be to hinder the benevolent in the exercise of the Christian virtue of almsgiving, and prevent their acquisition of 'merit'; that is, the question was looked at only from the point of view of the supposed interests of the donor. On the affirmative side it was urged that indiscriminate almsgiving was often demoralizing, and tended to perpetuate the evil it was imagined to remedy; that is, the question was looked at as it affected the recipient. It was dimly felt that the Christian duty was to remove the causes of social disease even more than to alleviate symptoms. And this incident is typical of the position which continually arises for the Christian who would express his Christianity in judicious citizenship. There is no short-cut to wise decisions. We must be governed by a rational and, it may be, laborious consideration of consequences: our action must be directed by utility and expediency, in the best sense of those terms. If we are inclined to shy at the often ill-used term 'expediency,' we may recall Paul's use of the term. We may say to the hasty philanthropist and to the social revolutionary alike: 'We do not condemn your intention; in that sense "all things are lawful" to you; but "all things are not expedient."'

Turn now to the thought of 'the kingdom.' The message of 'the kingdom' has been preserved down the Christian ages by the clause in the Lord's Prayer: 'thy kingdom come in earth.' But in recent times it has been brought to us afresh by New Testament scholarship. The disappointment of the early followers of Jesus in their expectation of a speedy Second Coming, and of 'the holy city, the new Jerusalem, coming down from God out of heaven,' though it necessarily turned their minds to what we call 'another world,' has had the effect, in later ages, of making Christianity more 'other-worldly' than has been good for mankind. The re-reading of the New Testament has taken us back to the original thought of Jesus. And, in my judgment, it is the duty of the modern Church to put that thought in the

forefront of its teaching: to proclaim that the aspiration towards an ideal society is not a secondary and subsidiary part of its doctrine but of its very essence. But then that essence must be freed from the temporary forms in which it was inevitably understood by the apostolic church. It must not be conceived of as catastrophic, as appearing, as it were, from outside by the fiat of an external will. It must be conceived of as the result of a Power working through the human mind and conscience: a result not mechanical or fatalistic, but one in the promotion of which we can ourselves participate. And in this participation we must be guided by all that historical and economic and psychological study can show us. Here utility and expediency are reinforced by that conception of 'development' which has been found to be of so much service in the understanding of the past. How exactly revolution is related to evolution, how new ideas originate, how far the 'conscious minority' can take control, with permanent effect, of the social organization of a modern state—these and similar questions cannot be answered off-hand. They are like, indeed they are modern shapes of, the eternal problem of Free Will and Necessity. I can only give my own view without attempting to argue it. It is that while progress does not necessarily, and without conscious human striving, arise out of past conditions, it can only take place on the basis of past conditions: that, in the main, the work of the reformer must consist in building on existing foundations; or, to change the image, in taking advantage of tendencies already existing, in expediting the transition, and in reducing the accompanying friction.

Take the great issue between Individualism and Socialism. Complete Socialism, whether of the older State Socialist or the newer Communist kind, seems to me as inadequate a social philosophy as complete Individualism. We have got out of the one: I see no good reason for falling into the other. I cannot conceive of a completely socialized community which would for ever remain so: that would be the negation of progress. I do not see how anyone can deny the immense benefits the world has received, and is receiving, from what is called 'individual enterprise,' or can fail to anticipate that, for a very long time to come, individual enterprise in various directions will continue to

be highly beneficial. On the other hand, that same 'individual enterprise'—which, in the modern economic sphere, we call Competition or Capitalism — has brought with it great evils. Modern economic history has consisted alike of the necessary liberation and of the necessary restraint of 'individual enterprise.' But the important matter to observe is that Capitalism contains forces, inherent within itself, which are profoundly affecting its organization, and are rendering more feasible some form or other of social control or management. It seems to me the duty of social reformers to concentrate their attention on those industries which are ripe or ripening for socialization; and to give serious thought, with an open mind, to the several forms that socialization can advantageously adopt in relation to the particular circumstances. To agitate for the socialization of industries or services which have not yet reached, by internal evolution, a relatively consolidated form, seems to me a waste of energy. On the other hand, for those who believe in the permanent value of 'individual enterprise' to struggle against social control in cases where a substantial monopoly has removed the advantages of competition is, in my judgment, to damage their own cause.

The civilized world is probably entering upon a period of increasing nationalization or socialization, though it may well take shapes which at present we can hardly anticipate. And the part the Christian Church can play will not be less but, in some respects, greater than before. It is called upon to create the initial driving force: the Christian will—an unselfish and active desire for social betterment. It must lift us out alike of material selfishness, with its callous disregard for others, and of the spiritual selfishness of some types of 'piety'; and yet hold us back from a fanaticism which does more harm than good. It must help us to be Christians without ceasing to be reasonable. And since all social control or management must depend for its success upon the temper of its human instruments, the Church must do all it can, directly and indirectly, to promote 'public spirit' and the simple virtues of truth and honesty and courtesy. For 'public spirit' is simply the civic manifestation of Christian 'love.'

THE DRAMATIC ELEMENT IN WORSHIP *

By Professor C. C. J. Webb, M.A., Oxford.

THE word *worship* will call up for different persons, who yet all alike 'profess and call themselves Christians,' scenes so diverse as to induce one to wonder that they should ever have been called by one name; the Roman Catholic High Mass to the Quaker meeting may stand for the opposite poles between which we may range the vast variety of religious observances which obtain in one or another section of the Christian world. In all, however, there is, as I will try to show, a dramatic element, which is inseparable from all worship, whether Christian or otherwise; and I have chosen to speak to you of this to-day because its consideration will link the subject of Religion, to which these early morning lectures are devoted, with that of the Drama, which is the dominant theme of this year's Summer Meeting. That there is such a dramatic element in the elaborate ritual of the Mass is obvious. Whether we regard the structure of the service, with its culmination in the consecration and elevation of the sacred elements, the purpose which it embodies of representing before God and man the atoning sacrifice of Christ, or even the mere accessories of special vestments, music, lights and so forth, the kinship between the liturgical worship of the more conservative Christian Churches and the form of art to which we commonly give the name of the Drama is unmistakable; and it is probable that this very unmistakable kinship with something whose associations are so often secular and even irreligious has often repelled pious persons from the ceremonial which exhibits that kinship, and driven them to seek in a manner of worship from which so far as possible everything suggestive of the Drama—everything (as they would say) theatrical—is banished, a kind of divine service which they could more easily believe, just because it is free from external trappings and from the unreality which attaches in some minds to all 'acting of a part,' to express that worship 'in spirit

* A lecture delivered at the Summer Meeting for University Extension Students, held at Oxford 1925.

and in truth' which the Gospel informs us is alone pleasing to God.

I have myself never been present at a Friends' meeting, but I suppose that such a meeting may fairly be taken, as I took it just now, for the extreme opposite among modes of Christian worship to the Catholic High Mass. Here are, as I understand, no dressing up, no set form of words to be recited, no studied gestures; no one even prays or preaches as a matter of prescribed course; only if some individual be moved by the Spirit to speak is there anything uttered at all. All would seem to be ordered with a view to excluding from the worship offered everything that could be called dramatic. But surely (if this be indeed aimed at) in vain. Not only—though there be no symbolical changes of posture, nor any appointed posture at all—would everyone feel certain attitudes to be decorous and fitting, others not so; but, after all, a man who decides that at a fixed hour he will join with his brethren in awaiting the possible impact on his soul of the Divine Spirit, must endeavour to throw himself into a frame of mind which may not come naturally to him at that moment; and it is difficult to believe that he will not assist himself so to do by such a disposition of his countenance and his whole body as he associates with grave and pious thoughts. Yet all this is in principle and essence dramatic; between it and the Orthodox Liturgy or Catholic Mass there is no great gulf fixed. There is a great interval indeed, but an interval which may be, and indeed is, bridged by an almost unbroken series of intermediaries.

The presence of a dramatic element in all *public* worship may perhaps be admitted without difficulty by most people. Symbolism or ceremonial of some sort, however simple, is absolutely indispensable to any rational or spiritual, that is to say, to any properly human and not merely instinctive action which is to be carried on by a number of people in common, whatever its purpose—religious, political, scientific, athletic, or convivial; and all symbolism or ceremonial is in its essence dramatic. But, even when this is admitted as regards *public* worship, it may be thought that *private* worship can dispense with anything of the kind. Moreover, although there is certainly no Christian community—though there have been Christian individuals—which

has not taken the saying of Christ that 'where two or three are gathered together in my name, there am I in the midst of them' as an invitation to public prayer; and although by far the greater part of Christendom has interpreted His words and actions at His Last Supper as the actual institution of a common rite; yet it must be confessed that, with that one exception of the promise to 'two or three that shall agree touching anything that they shall ask'—and even this suggests rather an informal and, as it were, impromptu combination than a permanent and organized custom—with this one exception the teaching of our Lord as regards prayer has in view the individual praying in secret, in his closet, even if in words which, like those He put into the mouth of His disciples, express fellowship with others, rather than a religious society, embracing many generations of individuals and approaching God with words and actions expressive of a common mind. This is all the more remarkable in view of the stress which, both under other religions and in the later history of the Christian Church itself, has usually been laid upon ordinances of public worship.

But is even *private* prayer, we may ask, wholly destitute of a dramatic element? Surely, at least in the majority of cases, it is by no means so. We kneel, we lift up our hands or eyes to heaven, or, like the publican in the parable, feeling ourselves unworthy to do so, we smite upon our breasts; often we use set forms of prayer, and, even when we do not, our petitions are naturally expressed in a traditional phraseology. In all these ways we are in some sense 'acting a part,' into which we throw ourselves, sometimes more and sometimes less.

The perception of the fact that in private prayer, as usually practised, there exists a dramatic element of the same kind as is more obviously present in public worship did not escape the attention of one whose work in the Philosophy of Religion was in its day epoch-making. I mean Immanuel Kant. This great thinker was in his whole outlook profoundly individualistic. The root of religion was for him the individual's consciousness of moral obligation, and the social aspect of religion, prominent though this has always been throughout its history, was in his view secondary, and even perhaps only hypothetically necessary in consequence of certain defects and limitations of our

human nature. No doubt, with the progress of reflection, I come to take note of the circumstance that, just because the moral law addresses itself to my conscience with the voice of absolute authority, requiring my obedience apart from all considerations of individual liking or interest, it must address itself with no less authority to the conscience of every other man whose mind, like mine, is sensitive to its appeal. Thus I come to envisage it as a *common* law, and myself as bound along with all other human and rational beings into one society in virtue of our common subjection to this 'law universal.' But this is merely an inference from what is in itself an individual, and even, one may say, a solitary experience. And when Kant comes to deal with existence of a common organization for moral or religious ends, such as we have in what we call a Church, we find that he bases it not immediately on anything intrinsically social in the character of our primary moral experience, but on the need, in view of the contagion of evil inherent in our intercourse with others whose nature, like our own, is radically inclined to prefer the gratification of appetite to the following of the course dictated by reason and conscience, to counteract this contagion by a combination expressly designed to enforce the claims of duty and to strengthen in all its members the resolution to submit themselves thereto. He was thus prepared to admit the utility and necessity in *public* worship of what we have called its dramatic element; this is incidental to it as a function of the religious community, and conducive to the purpose for which, according to his view, this community exists, namely, the purpose of mutual encouragement in the formation and building up in each individual of a dutiful disposition.

But he was not at all ready to allow that the dramatic element which he clearly saw was involved even in *private* worship, as usually practised, was conducive to the promotion of morality; and only so far as it should be so could he approve of religious observances at all. He thought that, on the contrary, it tended to unreality and to superstition. It tended to unreality as concentrating in particular actions, performed at particular times, that sense of being in the presence of Him to whom we are always equally present and responsible which should be diffused over our whole life. It tended also to super-

stition as suggesting an imaginary communion with Him on special occasions, such as we might have with a fellow human being, an acceptable homage such as we might render to a human prince, and which we might be tempted to fancy would serve as a substitute for the only true service of God, which consists in the dutiful discharge of our duties to our neighbours and to ourselves. It did not, however, escape Kant that the complete exclusion of a ceremonial or dramatic element from private prayer would mean practically the abolition of private prayer itself, as commonly understood. Accordingly we find him affirming that men tend to lay aside the practise of such prayer as they advance in virtue—a statement which the history of religion would hardly confirm—and that a man would naturally be ashamed of being found upon his knees *alone*, since this would suggest that he believed God to be peculiarly present with him in a sense inconsistent with a truly spiritual and ethical conception of the divine nature. So again we are told that if, at his own table, he observed a guest standing up to say his grace before taking his seat, he would bid him sit down. Yet this intolerance of private prayer, on account, as you will notice, of the inexpugnable element of drama in it, was not with Kant the result of an irreligious view of life, but because he thought—I do not say rightly—that it was inconsistent, in those who had attained to a certain level of intellectual cultivation, with the maintenance of an all-pervading 'spirit of prayer,' of which our every act should be a manifestation, and the continual cultivation of which should fulfil the apostolic injunction to 'pray without ceasing.' Our immediate concern, however, with Kant's rejection of all private worship, as that expression is commonly understood, is that it implies a recognition of a dramatic element which must always be present in it, and which he thinks can here serve no such useful purpose as, despite the dangers which even there beset it, it may and does serve in the case of *public* worship.

It is interesting to find a train of thought closely akin to that which led Kant to reject the practice of particular private devotions occurring in what might seem a very unlikely quarter —in the *Remains* of Richard Hurrell Froude. There is nothing unsuitable to this occasion in reminding you, who have come

here to spend a short time under the spell of the traditions of this University, of the famous movement which began in this place just a century ago, and which has appropriated to itself the designation which perhaps other movements, both of earlier and of later date, might claim to share with it, of the *Oxford Movement*. The singular fascination which the personality of its great leader, John Henry Newman, mirrored in the beauty of his incomparable style, and in the unforgettable story of his passage through this University from his Evangelical home to the Oratory at Birmingham, still keeps alive in men's minds the memory of the movement which he led. Only within the last few months a young Swedish divine, Dr. Brilioth, has given us, in his book on *The Anglican Revival*, a most interesting and sympathetic study of this most intensely English chapter of our national religious history from a foreigner's point of view. And among the figures of those who played their part in this Oxford Movement perhaps none, after Newman's own, is more attractive than that of his young and brilliant brother-Fellow of Oriel College, Richard Hurrell Froude, the elder brother of the well-known historian. He died from consumption in 1836 at the early age of 33; and after his death his illustrious friend published a number of his diaries and letters, which showed the world then and still shows us to-day, as it were in undress, the spirit of Tractarianism at its most adventurous and daring, its most sincere and its most devout.

I think we may confidently assert that Hurrell Froude was wholly unacquainted with Kant's objections to particular acts of worship; and his general attitude towards religion had only one feature (though that a very important one) in common with Kant's, namely, the conviction that all true religion is rooted in moral experience, and that the only kind of faith in theological doctrines which can rightly be regarded as a duty is that which consists in acting as though they were true. Yet we find him troubled by difficulties about the practice of Private Prayer which curiously echo the criticisms upon that practice which we have heard from the great German philosopher. 'There is something in the act itself,' he says, 'which appears stranger and stranger to me the older I grow; and the points in which it seems so strange are almost exclusively appropriated to it, not

bearing at all, or at any rate with much less force, on the ceremonies of Public Worship.' These we may be supposed to be strengthening 'in the mind of each person' present 'that impression which I also experience in uniting myself to them,' and testifying our 'reverence to the Master we acknowledge in the eyes of those who deny His authority.' But, as regards Private Worship, he finds it hard to justify the appearance by the adoption of certain postures and gestures of 'calling towards ourselves the attention of the Deity,' as though we were 'addressing Him in a different sense from that in which our serious thoughts can be called addresses to Him, and that He is regarding us in a sense different from that in which He can be said to be regarding all things.'

We of a later generation, however, accustomed to an evolutionary psychology, and familiarized with the importance of what Pascal called *l'automate*, the 'automaton,' or, as we say nowadays, the subconscious stratum in our souls, may perhaps seek the justification of the postures and gestures employed in private prayer in their effect upon this element of our nature, which conserves what belongs to a more primitive stage of our development than that which is capable of philosophical and theological reflection, and which is naturally less affected by such reflection than by dramatic representation, which is of course a far older and more universally distributed feature of human life. No doubt as men advance in the intellectual and spiritual life the necessity of arousing and disciplining *l'automate* by the use of conventional attitudes or forms of speech may grow less; and this is perhaps the element of truth in Kant's notion, to which I have already referred, that private prayer tends to be abandoned with progress in virtue; not that the good man ceases from the deliberate devotion of particular moments to the realization of the Divine Presence, in which he notwithstanding knows himself always to stand, but that he may become independent of certain means of persuading his *automate* at any rate not to hinder, or even perhaps to assist him in the work of such realization.

But if we must recognize even in private worship the presence and utility of a dramatic element, we must also recognize that its presence there is attended with certain moral dangers,

akin to those which have often been noted as attendant on the practice of the drama as a form of art. We must bear in mind that it is not only Philistines and Puritans that have laid stress upon these. Readers of Plato's *Republic* will remember how one who is himself one of the world's supreme artists, and whose chosen form of artistic expression was one near akin to drama, the Dialogue, would exclude from his ideal commonwealth any drama which should represent other than noble and virtuous characters, lest his citizens should by the impersonation of characters base and bad become such as those whom they impersonate. And by the side of Plato we may set Goethe, who is generally looked upon as standing among great men for the very antithesis of Puritanism, but who at the end of the second part of his *Wilhelm Meister*, the first part of which is mainly concerned with the theatre, surprises us by making the actor's art the only one instruction wherein is not to be obtained in his 'Pedagogic Utopia,' and that on grounds very similar to those alleged by Plato for the exclusion of it from his Republic.

The mischief which Plato and Goethe apprehend from the cultivation of the actor's art is that the actor should infect his own character with the evil in that which he assumes; that which may be apprehended from the indulgence of what we may for the moment be allowed to call the histrionic side of religious worship and devotion is that a man may be content with the impersonation of a character which ought to be his without making it in truth his own. In both alike the peril lies in forgetfulness of the distinction between what is due to a real and an assumed character; but, while the risk with the player is that, forgetting that it is of the essence of art not to be life, he mistakes life for art, the risk to the devotee is that, forgetting the same truth, he mistake art for life. It is not his business, as it is the player's, to practice drama as an art, as his life's vocation indeed, yet as *art*, not as life. He, on the other hand, is merely using drama, not as an art which is his vocation, but as a means to help himself to *be* in real life that which for the moment he represents; and so, if he rest therein, he is putting the means in the place of the end; for his end is not to act a worshipper, but to *be* one.

But the consideration that it seems natural to man to become a worshipper by acting the part of one may carry us further.

Students of the history of religion know that in many ancient rites there is a dramatic impersonation of the god in whose honour they are celebrated, and a dramatic representation of his doings and sufferings. In later developments of this type of worship the dramatic character of the ceremonial is well understood; but in the most primitive instances (for example, among certain Australian tribes) it would seem that, while the actual impersonators of the god of course know what they are at, the women and the boys who are not yet initiated into the tribal mysteries are at any rate supposed to be ignorant—the children no doubt often really are so—that the terrifying sounds and sights which indicate a supernatural presence are produced by their husbands, fathers, brothers, or sons dressed up for the occasion; although suspicion, we may be sure, often creeps in, just as children among ourselves come to guess that Santa Klaus or Father Christmas is only their father or mother in disguise. Moreover, there is a very widely-spread belief that the imitation of movements is apt to provoke the performance of the like by others; a belief with a real foundation in fact, as regards the influence of the behaviour of one human being on another, but which is often, naturally enough, extended by the inexperience of primitive men from their fellow-men to natural forces. Thus attempts are made by raising clouds of smoke or sprinkling water to induce the rain to fall, or by kindling fires to bring the desired sunshine and warmth to dry the ground. It has been with much probability conjectured that dramatic exhibitions began in magical practices of this kind with a directly utilitarian object. We call them *magical* because an endeavour to influence the behaviour of unconscious material things by means which could only be effective with conscious beings seems to us something quite apart from those proceedings which harmonize with the ordinary world of common sense and experimental science. When it is sought by imitative performances to affect the course of physical nature, bodies are treated as if they were minds; when such performances are designed to compel the action of superhuman spirits who are supposed to control the forces of nature, the magical character which *we* rather than those who perform them are disposed to attribute to them consists in the supposition that these spirits are influenced, like

bodies, automatically or mechanically—compelled or constrained rather than persuaded. With the progress of religious thought this kind of proceeding passes into what we may truly call 'worship'; the spell becomes a prayer; and the dramatic representation of a god's acts or adventures is not so much conceived to be directly productive of actions on his part of the same kind, as on the one hand to show him honour by the commemoration of his deeds or sympathy in that of his sufferings, and on the other to create and foster in the worshipper a sense of union or even of identification with the life of the divinity whom he impersonates.

Now can we recognize in the Christian religion, we may ask, anything of which these primitive superstitions, as they seem to us, contain the germ and the promise?

The answer to this question which seems to me to be the right one I can only give you now in a very abbreviated and summary fashion, leaving many details for any who are interested in the subject to fill up for themselves.

At first sight, then, it might perhaps seem as if Christianity had no room in its worship for an attempt by the worshipper, through impersonation of the object of his worship, to identify himself with God. Christianity is rooted in the Jewish monotheism, which exalts God far above nature; which sees in Him not a Being—such as were so many of the gods of the nations from whom the Jew distinguished himself as a true believer from idolators—whose activity is immanent in natural processes and in the instinctive desires and behaviour of men, but the 'high and holy One that inhabiteth eternity,' the Creator of the world, not a part of it or even its soul; of too pure eyes than to behold iniquity; in whose sight the very heavens are not clean, and who charges even His angels with folly. Even the representation of Him in any sensible form, 'the likeness of anything that is in heaven above, or in the earth beneath, or in the waters under the earth,' was forbidden to the Jew. And, although the Christian doctrine that the eternal Word of God was made flesh in Jesus Christ might seem to abate the rigour of this utter transcendence, yet the Christian doctrine of the Incarnation differs from analogous doctrines in other creeds in two respects, which cause it to offer less encouragement than they to dramatic impersonation.

For, in the first place, the Incarnation in Jesus is regarded by Christians as unique. There is nothing in Christianity like the series of avatars of Vishnu in Hinduism or the succession of Buddhas in the developed form of the religion founded by Gautama. In the second place, in contrast with the Saviour gods of other mystery religions, in competition with which Christianity challenged the allegiance of the Graeco-Roman world in the first centuries of our era—in contrast with a Mithra, a Hermes, a Serapis—the divine Lord of the Christians is an historical personage, our conception of whose character and teaching can be controlled by an authorized record, claiming, not to have come down from immemorial antiquity, but to represent the witness of certain known individuals at a definite and comparatively recent date.

In consequence, although — or rather *because* — Jesus had lived a human life and died a human death, the identification with Him of other men was never congenial to the genius of the religion in which He was the central Figure. Hence, when they came into existence, Christian Passion-Plays—such as some of us may have seen at Ober-Ammergau—although the performance of them might be undertaken in a truly religious spirit and regarded as a religious duty, have yet never been regarded as actually part of the worship of the Christian Church. When the Bavarian villagers to whom I have referred are about to enact their play, they prepare themselves by a devout attendance at Mass; but the Mass is altogether distinct from the Passion-play, and the Passion-play from the Mass. There is thus unquestionably something in Christianity which is adverse to the dramatic element in its worship assuming the explicit shape of the representation by the worshipper of the person, acts, and sufferings of the object of his worship.

And yet, on further inspection, we may find that this same religion supplies in its theology an interpretation of the aspiration which seems to underlie the widespread custom of such a representation. For in this theology God the Father is from eternity not without His Son, who is at once the Ideal of the worshipper and an integral element in the essential nature of the Being who is worshipped. If the Christian worshipper is bidden to address God as 'our Father,' St. Paul teaches that this is to

address Him as Jesus did; for he says that we can only so call Him because we are inspired so to do by 'the Spirit of His Son sent forth into our hearts, crying Abba, Father,' where the word 'Abba' surely recalls the actual Aramaic word which the Master Himself used in the days of His flesh.

Here we have in germ what we call the doctrine of the Trinity: the Father, the Son, the Spirit of the Son, presented not as a remote and unintelligible mystery, but as the secret of the Christian life, wherein the Christian, living by the Spirit whereby Jesus lived, that is, by a Spirit of sonship to God, shares in the life of God Himself, and in his worship of God as Father displays his consciousness of this spiritual union with the eternal Son. In the central formula of Christian worship, the Lord's own Prayer, this is indicated, as St. Paul's words tell us, by the address 'Our Father'; and it has been the custom of Christendom to suggest it in other prayers by the addition of some phrase implying that they are offered in the name of—that is, as it were, in the person of—the Son. Again, in the Eucharist, the supreme rite wherein Christians join together to testify their participation in a common life, they present themselves to God as mystically united with Christ, with whose humanity, represented by the one loaf of many grains which symbolizes the Christian community itself, they incorporate their own. Thus the Christian religion, which at first might seem to discourage that most ambitious element of drama in religion which takes the form of the assumption of the person of the God that is worshipped, reveals itself as the fulfilment of the aspiration which that assumption crudely expressed. It holds out to us the promise of a sure participation in the divine nature, consisting essentially in the good life, the life of love to God and man, and of the sacrifice of self in their service, after the pattern and in the spirit of Jesus Christ; a life which is symbolized, artistically expressed, and brought home to our imagination and our feelings in a ceremonial of worship, even as is our love for our parents in the celebration of their birthday or for our college in a college festival; but which is itself the worship in spirit and in truth, apart from its expression of and ministration to which the outward worship has no magical virtue or mechanical efficacy of its own.

On the other hand—since in all spiritual progress unity and distinction, instead of contradicting one another, are found to be mutually implied in one another—just because we are enabled in Christianity to rise above the confusion of different kinds of value which are inherent in magic, the ceremonial of worship can be allowed to possess an aesthetic value of its own which may subserve the spiritual worship whereof it is an expression, but yet, just because it is no longer *confused* with that worship, can admit without injury thereto an independent development as an art. This has, it is plain, to a great extent happened in the case of the music of the Mass. Such a development indeed involves, like all life, a certain tension, which is a case of that, which exists throughout the entire range of art, between the independent value which Art rightly challenges for itself and the claims of the conduct of life as a whole, in which Art can be no more than an element.

Thus, in the special instance of religious worship, there is a danger, on the one side, of the degradation of Art to a mere instrument of edification; on the other, of the substitution of art for the worship in spirit and in truth, to which it may minister, but which it cannot replace. Such dangers, however, beset us in every department of life; and there is nothing worth doing which does not involve like risks.

My conclusion, then, as to the dramatic element in worship is twofold. First, that the existence of such an element must be acknowledged in all worship, private as well as public, and that man normally learns to worship by acting the part of a worshipper.

And, secondly, that the dramatic assumption in worship of the character of the object of worship, which has characterized the outward expression of religious emotion from primitive times, reveals a principle of religious experience which becomes explicit in the theological doctrine that true worship does not remain as it were external to and at a distance from its Object, but participates in the inner life and process of that Object, which is the eternal intercourse of a Son with a Father in a Spirit of mutual and co-equal love.

MODERNIST VERACITY

By the Rev. Hubert Handley, M.A., formerly Vicar of St. Thomas's, Camden Town, N.W.

THE last meeting of the late Modern Churchmen's Conference was held on Sunday evening, August 30th. It was a gathering of the small remnant, collected in a room at Somerville. 'Business' was said to be the first aim; 'business' proposals shot up on all sides for about an hour, showing that people who read Reitzenstein in the original can still be lively. Just towards the close a religious question of the first moment was raised—raised by one of the youngest members in a tone and temper which won respect. The meeting was plainly, and rightly, thankful to him. A short, but most fragmentary discussion followed. The debate from first to last was so scrappy and hurried as to go only to the edge of each argument. The brief speeches were even, I fear, to some listeners actually misleading. By the kind permission of the Editor I will here try, from one point of view, to treat the matter more fully.

What was the introduced and debated question? *Modernist veracity*. It is a wide subject. I will cut it down to this interrogatory, which is the core of the matter: Are the Modernist clergy honest in reciting the Creed? I will even pin attention to one point, to one clause in the Creed: 'Who was conceived by the Holy Ghost, Born of the Virgin Mary.' If we can settle our account with that clause, we have settled, in principle, with all.

I will leave alone past controversy on the general subject, though I have in view the judgment of past high authorities—Sidgwick, Rashdall, Mark Pattison, Mill, Tyrrell, Stopford Brooke, Pfleiderer, Auguste Sabatier, and others. I start *now*, and ask: How do I, a modern clergyman, to-day understand and recite the affirmation 'Who was conceived by the Holy Ghost, Born of the Virgin Mary'?

(1) Do I believe it to be literally true? No. I am entirely doubtful. Criticism is overwhelming against the clause; but is not yet, I think, unanimous. So I keep an open mind, strongly expecting—if I may say so with great reverence, not without pain—that the clause must go. (2) If I do not literally believe

the clause, is it honest to say that I do? No. Literally it is not honest. (3) Can an assertion of belief be literally dishonest and morally right? That is the question I wish to answer.[1]

First, take a large sheet of white cardboard, six feet square, and print upon it in vertical columns, with thin vertical lines between, the whole Book of Common Prayer. Let the three parties within the Church approach it in order—Catholic, Evangelical, Modernist. Each party will honestly give a general assent to the whole impressive chart. Now let each party in order, drawing its finger slowly and intently down each column, stop at each paragraph, sentence, or word from which at heart it dissents. Let Modernist disapproval colour its disapproved passages red; Catholic, blue; Evangelical, green. It will be a variegated chart! defaced up and down with patches of green, blue, and red repeatedly. We have already taken a red patch and have catechized a Modernist clergyman upon it. Take now a blue or Catholic patch and examine it.

Take Article XXV, *Of the Sacraments*.

> 'Those five commonly called Sacraments—that is to say, Confirmation, Penance, Orders, Matrimony and extreme Unction—are not to be counted for Sacraments of the Gospel. . . . The [two] Sacraments were not ordained of Christ to be gazed upon, or to be carried about, but that we should duly use them.'

What I am going to say is painful. It might seem to carry a most unintended taint of disrespect for the High Church clergy, many of whom, with Keble at their head, have held up the torch

[1] At the meeting in Somerville, August 30th, I spoke a few words unexpectedly on the spur of the moment. The point I wished to make was this: Among Modernists there is a temptation to give to terms such as 'Virgin' and 'the third day' a forced and secondary sense, what is sometimes called a non-natural sense; and then to go on and maintain that recital of the words in this imported sense is literally 'honest,' is as 'honest' as the recital of the words in their original and literal significance by rigid traditionalists. I wished to confess to the meeting that I had come to view that practice and that contention as wrong and unjustifiable: that, for myself, it was truer to say at once, 'No! the first thing to get clear in our minds is that to recite those phrases at all is for many among us literally dishonest; and the next thing to do is to look round and see then where we morally are.' I went on to utter, I fear, some misleading sentences. I seemed to concede that this position which I had advocated was immoral and to advise that the intellectual crisis in the Church was so urgent that we clergy, and coming ordinands, must leap into the gap and contend for doctrinal freedom even by immoral means. That is far from my underlying thought. The Church cannot be served, the Modernist cause cannot be furthered, with immoral weapons. I have completed my statement and put the matter into the full light in the following pages.

for me when all else was dark and have led me on towards the City—'I set My saints before thee in the Way.' But we are facing certain dissents within the Church of England, and no personal considerations must divert or cloud our gaze. How does the Anglo-Catholic priest here stand? (1) At his Ordination he gave a general assent to the Thirty-nine Articles. (2) Remembering the genius, the struggles, the sacrifices of the Reformation, it would be fair, I think, to say that the Article on the Sacraments is the key of the whole Reformed Position. (3) To reject, indeed to frustrate, the Article on the Sacraments is to combat the very purpose in which the Articles were conceived. (4) The Articles were the password by which the Anglo-Catholic entered the priesthood; and the occasional claim, made by less sensitive consciences, that the Articles (because they are not, like the Creed, often recited) are not of continuing obligation—that, if one may courteously say so, is a trick. (5) In a word, then: To thwart and discredit Article XXV particularly, and in a less degree the Articles generally, as Anglo-Catholic priests appear to do — that literally is dishonest.[2]

Come now to an Evangelical or green patch of dissent. Again, with what reluctance do I here investigate a blemish! Who has not known the charm of the Evangelical character, of the Evangelical look? The unearthly goodness of Evangelical clergy who have 'found peace'? Last year I met one such who was going as a missionary to China—out to loneliness and danger; who was modest and serene, bearing the mark of the sons of God. And shall I, safe at home, who never did heroic things like that, drag out the term 'literally dishonest' in his case? Well, he shares in the defects, as in the glories, of his Church; and even for him there is literal dishonesty in dissents which appear as assents. Recall the Ordination of Priests.

There are considerable blocks of sacerdotalism which have been carried over from the Middle Ages and imbedded in our Prayer Book. They are a trial to the Evangelical minister: they are his green patches on the chart. For instance: (1) In the Ordination of Priests occurs this solemn commission:

> 'Whose sins thou dost forgive, they are forgiven; and whose sins thou dost retain, they are retained.'

[2] With profound respect for Newman, I cannot think that even Tract XC invalidates this charge.

The formula is taken over precisely, word for word, from the mediaeval Service books:

> 'Quorum remiseris peccata, remittuntur eis; et quorum retinueris, retenta erunt.'

The formula is steeped in sacerdotal intention. (2) The Anglo-Catholic priest prizes these words; takes them in their literal sense, with their strict priestly implications and obligations, and faithfully obeys them. (3) The Evangelical minister does not accept the words in their primary, sacerdotal sense; he imports into them a secondary and different meaning of his own; he mitigates their uncompromising sacerdotalism into something actually unlike; in its literal sense he disobeys the injunction. This may be necessary, but it is not literally honest.

So there are three groups of literal dishonesty in our Church—Modernist, Catholic, Evangelical; three classes of patch on the chart—red, blue, and green. Do three wrongs, then, make a right? No. But the sting, the *badness* of a wrong may be so attenuated by circumstances as to dwindle away. I hold this to be the case with all the three adduced dishonesties of the Anglican clergy; for three reasons.

(1) The dissents are *inevitable*. In any comprehensive and free Church they must be. This opinion is confirmed by the distinguished authority of Professor Percy Gardner[3] in his paper read before the Conference. To eliminate such patches of dissent you would first have to divide the Anglican Church into three smaller Churches—Modernist, Catholic, Evangelical; it would then be found that each thus separated Church must be sub-divided into yet narrower groups; and so on indefinitely. Dean Stanley, if I remember rightly, once said that if every Anglican clergyman went out of the Church or out of his ministry owing to some such tacit or declared incongruity, they would all go out one by one. That does not mean that we are to welcome the patches, almost to glory in them. They are defects to be reduced to the least possible dimensions.[4] But such defects, such dissents in any free and comprehensive Church are, we repeat, inevitable. Further, these or like dissents are, I be-

[3] May I be permitted to make an acknowledgment? Prof. Percy Gardner, next to von Hügel, during the last twenty years, starting with *Exploratio Evangelica*, has been my chief religious teacher. His work breathes the vital lesson—that Liberal Religion must be religious. Prof. Gardner's personal friendship has been one of the honours of my life.

[4] Abraham Lincoln would not 'mislead the people by a single adjective'

lieve, inevitable even in a tightly bound and authoritative Church like the Roman; only in that case they are, if I may respectfully say so, pushed out of sight and less healthy.

(2) The dissents must be *avowed*. There must be nothing hidden or furtive in the matter. The dissents must be avowed at the right time and place, *e.g.*, to Church authorities or in a theological lecture or book. But 'avowal' does not imply indiscriminate talk of these difficult problems among the unlearned or before a general congregation. There are certain facts of our nature which parents must not tell to young children, to their detriment. There are certain maladies, or aggravations of a malady, which a doctor must not reveal to his patient; the doctor must not be false, but he must be reticent. So the Modernist parish priest, for example, must not, except to instructed congregations or when his advice is sought, air critical problems and troubled questionings before his flock; his duty is to be positive, to preach Christ's gospel,[5] to build up Christian lives, at all costs to minister to sinners and sufferers, not, if I may write so without disrespect, to be a critical agitator.

(3) The dissents, when they have been avowed, become *literal*, not moral, dishonesties. 'Dear Sir' is formally, but not always emotionally, true—far from it; yet the use is legitimate because the formality is avowed. Or take a more dignified comparison. On Septuagesima Sunday thousands of clergy read in church the first chapter of *Genesis*. When they say 'the evening and the morning were the first day' thousands of simple listeners take the words literally and believe that the readers literally mean the words; whereas probably not one in five of the reading clergy thinks that literally there was an evening or a morning or a first day at all. There is here no vice, no deceit. The dishonesty is verbal, not substantial. The verbally dishonest clergy at the right time and place have avowed, or are ready to avow, their literal disbelief, along with their spiritual delight, in the chapter. Our Modernist, Catholic, Evangelical dissents in a larger way are like that.[6]

[5] Dr. Montagu Butler, the late Master of Trinity, happily applied to words of a modern sermon the strangely impressive line from Sophocles (Œd.R. 871): μέγας ἐν τούτοις θεός, οὐδὲ γηράσκει. So, I venture to think, may the line be reverently applied to the words of the gospel itself: 'A mighty God is in them, and therefore they wax not old.'

[6] Of course, there is this difference. The Conservative minister's belief in the Lesson is only implied; while the Modernist minister's belief in the

I have defended generally the Catholic, Evangelical, Modernist clergy as to their respective dissents. But Modernist integrity is our specific concern—the sincerity of the Modernist parson. Again I will lay bare my own case to the light. *Ex uno disce omnes.*

(1) 'Who was conceived by the Holy Ghost, Born of the Virgin Mary,' still carries for me a huge meaning, sacrosanct. It means this:

> 'God, having of old time spoken unto the fathers in the prophets by divers portions and in divers manners, hath at the end of these days spoken unto us in his Son.' 'God was in Christ reconciling the world unto himself.' 'The Word became flesh, and dwelt among us.'

Or, to pass to modern language, there is the fine dictum of Dr. Edwyn Bevan:

> 'The inner Reality of the universe has looked into human eyes through the eyes of Jesus Christ.'

Now that is what the old Creed-makers *meant*. That is what they were *after*. They tried to stammer it out in words. Words come and go: the meaning abides. The meaning may shed its old verbal skin, it will be all the more alive when it does so; but while the old skin is there, it is by that that the meaning shows itself and is recognizable. 'Who was conceived by the Holy Ghost, Born of the Virgin Mary,' is the ancient and venerable covering of the belief in the Divinity of Christ. Until, if ever, it is cast off and another covering succeeds, it is in possession and will be treasured by Christians. Though the words for me may be, or may become, outworn, the meaning inside them is for me imperishable.

My position, then, is tolerable; not open to moral blame; but open to moral relief. We want reform; not in the meaning of the Creed, but in the terminology.[7] To this end there are varied proposals: (*a*) Dean Rashdall, writing in 1908, advised thus:[8]

> 'The time may come when the proposal to substitute the original Nicene Creed (in which the clauses that most trouble conscience are

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Creed is actually expressed—'I believe.' But the moral parallel is close enough. In both cases the minister literally does not mean what he says, and in both cases simple congregations think that he does.

[7] Of course, by nearly universal consent several other clauses of the Creed have quite lost their literal meaning, and in one case almost all meaning.

[8] *Anglican Liberalism* (1908), p. 134.

absent) for the present Constantinopolitan formula may receive a respectful hearing; but that is not to-day. Perhaps it may be to-morrow.'

(*b*) Prof. Kirsopp Lake,[9] disclaiming both the literal and the 'secondary' interpretations, offers his own plan:

> 'We will give up the creeds as theological statements, but retain them as an integral part of a beautiful service. . . . The service is our heritage, which we will neither give up nor mutilate. . . . The Liturgy . . . ought to be preserved with as much care as a cathedral.'[10]

(*c*) Another plan, congenial to many of us and full of hope, is to make the use of the Creeds optional. (*d*) Another plan is to transfer the Creeds to the end of the Prayer Book as a historical supplement, and to substitute in public recital the Beatitudes. (*e*) 'The lesson-book of the *Ecclesia*,' said Hort, 'is not a law but a history.' And there are signs of Anglican relaxation in the legal grip of the Creeds. The Archbishops' Committee on Ordinands recommends thus:[11]

> 'That great relief would be afforded . . . by a statement from the Episcopate as a whole to the effect that, recognising the intellectual difficulties which arise out of some of the clauses in the Creeds, they would not look upon perplexity or uncertainty on such points as in all cases a necessary barrier to Ordination, and that they would give consideration to any such difficulties brought before them individually.'

(2) Modernist clergy are Anglican to the core. There is a noble dedication by Pusey to the *Ecclesia Anglorum* in which he was 'born' and 'fed' and 'in whose Bosom' he hoped 'to die,' part of which runs thus:

To
The Church of England.
Beloved and afflicted,
And by affliction purified,
Once the Parent of Saints,
Now through our sins[12] fallen, yet arising,
In
Reverent and grateful affection,
from
Her humblest and most unworthy Son.

[9] *The Religion of Yesterday and To-Morrow* (1925), pp. 102-3.

[10] Admiring Prof. Lake, I yet regret, along with many of his religious forecasts, this proposal. It would block the way of dogmatic reform. The Creeds, if they are kept in the Services, need not be viewed as works of art, but to be shortened.

[11] *Report* (1925), p. 15.

[12] Perhaps the two chief sins in our Church to-day are these: (1) intellectual—the Church as a whole does not face Knowledge; (2) moral—the Church does not *suffer* enough on behalf of stricken lives and to cure the ills of society.

My love and devotion to the Church of England is of little note beside Dr. Pusey's, but it is equally passionate and sincere.

(3) 'Son, go work to-day in my vineyard.' The Modernist field or plot within the vineyard grows, thank God! the Christian character, grows great Christians. So do the other fields. The 'dissents' in the soil do not mar the vegetation. The Catholic field grows Liddon; the Evangelical field, Hannington; the old High Church field, Selwyn[13]; the Modernist field, Sanday. Besides, and more important still, all about our Modernist ground, as about the others, in nooks, corners, quiet spots there spring up modest plants, beautiful fruit—the faithful hidden lives of Christendom. It is enough. It is a determining fact; which in our hours of Modernist trial or personal weakness is charged for us with consolation and fortitude. 'And he arose, and did eat and drink, and went in the strength of that meat forty days and forty nights.'

(4) A Modernist ordinand, approaching middle-age, once said to me: 'If I were rector of a village, and the rustics knew what I was thinking when I said the Creed, they would despise me.' How I respected that man! his wistful, troubled look, determined to be genuine! Yet I think he was wrong. The peasants could not judge the whole problem; they would see only a fragment of it; they would be finding a verdict without the evidence. A Modernist must settle the question of his ordination not by judgment of the village, not by the alarm of good men, not by the raillery of Church newspapers, not even (and this is where he is hit) by disquietude in his own family. These influences must not decide. The man must decide in the inmost sanctuary of his own being. We will not intrude there. But if within those precincts the intimations are adverse, a clergyman that man must not be: all honour to him. On the other hand, if *there* the thing of his life happens and he hears the call to put on the yoke of Christ, the *stola immortalitatis*, and to serve in the ministry of the Church of God—happy is he! Nothing else matters. *Paratus ad omnia*, says the *Imitation*.

[13] Selwyn's last recorded words, murmured in Maori, were 'It is all light.'

THREE GREAT POWERS IN LIFE

By the Rev. Samuel McComb, D.D., Harvard University, U.S.A.

WHAT is man? Ancient tradition makes man's dwelling-place the centre of the universe, the stars in heaven lamps lit by the Divine hand and fed

> 'With everlasting oil, to give due light
> To the misled and lonely traveller.'

At the centre of this naïve cosmogony there is shadowed forth a great truth. The centre and crown of all earthly things is man, consummation as he is of God's creative work: to him is given lordship over all things animate and inanimate. He need not search the heavens or the earth for a miraculous sign: he is himself the standing wonder of the known cosmos. And he is this, not because of his stature or strength, in which the lion and the tiger excel him, but because he can think and is conscious of his thought, can in moral choice erect himself above himself or sink his personality in brute impulse and non-moral nature.

And yet in the light of modern knowledge such words seem to mock us. For to the eyes of the astronomer, what is man? The inhabitant of a paltry satellite of a not very important sun. If the psalmist was overwhelmed by the meanness of man when contrasted with the few thousand stars visible to the naked eye, what would have been his despair had be known of the seventy-five millions of worlds which the modern telescope has brought within the range of vision? What would he have said had he been told that some of those worlds are suns so vast that in comparison with them our own sun is little better than a glowing cinder? Or go to the physical chemist and ask him: What is man? And he will reply, man is a curious compound of certain particles of inorganic matter. A few pounds of carbon and lime, a few ounces of iron, potassium, phosphorus, and so forth, so many cubic feet of oxygen, hydrogen, and nitrogen—of such is man. These give rise to the phenomenon of life and movement, and with their dissolution man disappears—and where is

he? Or ask the biologist the question of my text, and he will answer: Man is of near kinship to the brute creation, a scion of a progressive simian stock, and shares with the anthropoid ape a common ancestry. The science of the biologist notes that in the human embryo there are close resemblances to the embryos of lower forms of life; that the mental growth of the child after birth recapitulates the historical development of the race from savage conditions to those of comparative culture; nay, more, that the process of degradation which intoxication produces in any individual represents *in the reverse order* the successive stages in the elevation of the race. Thus in alcoholism the higher intuitive powers go first, then self-control, then shame, then speech, then the upright attitude, then the power of locomotion. Reverse the order of these events, and you have a rough outline of man's ascent from the non-human to the human, from barbarism to civilization.

What have we to say to these answers? What but this, that they are true so far as they go. Science in its own realm has rights that are sacred. Every effort to suppress or distort its findings has brought humiliation to the men who lifted the weapons of their despair against them. Yet science does not profess to cover all the facts. It selects for its own purpose certain aspects of humanity, confines its attention to them, and excludes from its purview all freedom, spirituality, creative love and passionate aspiration as things irrelevant to its aim and purposes. Listen to the voices of religion and philosophy and you will hear a far different story:

> 'What, then, is man?' cries Carlyle. 'He endures but for an hour and is crushed before the moth—yet in the being and in the working of a faithful man is there already (as all faith from the beginning gives assurance) a something that pertains not to this wild death-element of time, but triumphs over time and is and will be when time shall be no more!'
>
> 'O rich and various man,' exclaims Emerson; 'thou palace of sight and sound, carrying in thy senses the morning and the night and the unfathomable galaxy, in thy brain the geometry of the city of God, in thy heart the power of love and the realms of right and wrong!'

Nor are these the overstrained utterances of poetic and imaginative minds. Calm reflection assures us that all the sciences, physical, chemical, biological, are themselves products, not of unconscious, but of conscious rational life. Blot out from the

universe self-conscious mind, and the very heavens would become literally *insignificant*, that is, without a meaning or a reason for their existence.

To-day men are sore-pressed by the hard and brutal facts of experience. They want to believe, but they search in vain for a sure foothold for faith. Yet if they would but study the realities of their own nature they would find a way to the invisible and the eternal. Man belongs to two worlds, the phenomenal and the noumenal, that which is apprehended by the senses, and that which is apprehended by mind. He may begin with the first, but face to face with the spiritual he must come sooner or later. To-day he is being driven to look within, to ask himself: Why am I here? What is the meaning of this material civilization? For what end am I creating it? And these questions receive an answer only when he learns what he himself really is. What, then, does he find when he looks within?

1. He finds a *power to think.*

> 'Man,' says Pascal, 'is clearly made to think; here lies all his dignity and all his merit, and his whole duty is to think aright.'

What is thought? We cannot tell. All we know is that it is a mysterious something, a form of energy which thrills through us and is the driving power of life. Confronted with the outer world, it questions all things in earth and sky and sea, and it rests not until it obtains an answer. This means that mind is but re-thinking the thoughts of another and a greater Mind. It means that we are the children, not only of an All-Father, but of an All-Thinker. How could our minds interpret harmoniously the facts of Nature unless Nature was the embodiment of a rational intelligence? Thought, then, is the great creator. The universe rises in all its unimaginable glory at its bidding. Man shares in this creative power. He wrestles with chaos and wrings out of it order, beauty, a cosmos in which he is at home everywhere. The animal reacts to its environment and asks not the reason why, but man knocks at the gate of truth and will not be denied. He dissolves the solid framework of things into a whirl of electrical forces. He is a 'being of large discourse, looking before and after,' able to reconstruct the vanished past and make men and empires live again, or press forward into the unknown and behold visions of worlds not yet realised. He is

a citizen of that realm described by an old Hindu thinker when he said: 'There are no chariots there nor roads for chariots. The soul makes for itself chariots and roads for chariots. There are no joys or rejoicings there. The soul makes for itself joys and rejoicings. For the spirit of man is creator.' Look at the mighty things thought has done. Science, philosophy, government, morals, painting, music, religion—these are the creations of man's spiritual energy. The Parthenon, the *Republic* of Plato, the Sistine Madonna, the *Divine Comedy*, *Hamlet*—these are not supernatural, though they seem so to ordinary men. No: it is their intense humanity, the powers of mind raised to their highest possibilities, that is their distinguishing mark.

But thought reveals its dynamic qualities, not in the rare products of genius only, but in the life of the most commonplace of men. It creates character. All the moral issues of life are mental. Thoughts produce feelings; feelings issue in action; action repeated begets habit; and habit creates character, and character spells destiny. How vital, then, is the relation of our thought to our welfare and happiness! What kind of thoughts do you cherish? Are they pure, holy, beautiful, like crystal water, flushing the soul with cleansing and sweetening power? Do they ever speak to you in words full of melody, sounding in the brain as if another and a greater had spoken them? Or are they ugly, base, sinful, born of earthly desire, sinking the soul in darkness, narrowing its capacities, enslaving it to infernal powers? On your answer depends your value to God and to man.

Still more: our thoughts affect for weal or woe our bodily health. Take that form of thought which goes by the name of worry. We all know what it means, futile regret over past sins, past mistakes, past follies; miserable foreboding about the future, imagination arraying the unknown in colours that terrify and paralyse—these malign powers shake the soul to its very centre, and all life threatens to grow into a tissue of impossibilities. Too often the victim of worry develops disorders of mind and body which make existence well-nigh intolerable. But if thought can induce sickness, it can also create health. Think thoughts of joy and health and you will be joyful and

healthful. You will not banish undesirable thoughts by saying to yourself, 'I will not think them; I will drive them out of my mind, and by firm resolve will keep them out.' You must switch the current of your thinking on to a new line. You must turn the mind to thoughts that are positive and constructive, whatsoever things are true, honest, just, pure and lovely, and these will inhibit the negative and harmful thoughts of the lower self. The noble and beautiful furnishing of the mind may be all summed up in that great word—'the Mind of Christ.' Open the mind to Christ's wonderful thought of God, as the life-giving Love whose children we are, and all our pains and miseries are drowned in an infinite flood of divine pity, mercy, and tenderness. There are some who under the influence of a narrow religious experience develop a morbid conscience, magnifying venial offences into flagrant crimes against God and man. They spend their time in senseless reveries, and are a burden to themselves and their friends. What they need is to ponder the new and true conception of God as the spirit of love, writ large in the Son of Man, the Ideal of our humanity. To believe in this God, to rest in Him, to have the mind absorbed in the alluring qualities of His being so that the very thought of Him calls up these glorious powers, love, joy, peace, righteousness, goodness, truth—here is medicine for the healing of sorrow and pain, here is inspiration to lighten the conscience and set free the will.

2. Great as is the power of thought, greater still is the power of *faith*. It is man's peculiar prerogative to believe in and commit himself to unseen realities. Yet perhaps there is no religious word about which there is so much confusion and misunderstanding as this word 'faith.' People ask: In what do you believe? They ought to ask: In *whom* do you believe? For faith in its strict sense is a state of mind possible only from person to person. We may believe propositions and doctrines, but we *believe in* a person.

You believe that there is a God who made the world and all things in it. It is well: but 'the devils also believe and tremble.' Such belief is very easy. The reasons for the existence of a God may seem to us quite sufficient, and we accept them. As Coleridge says, one grain of sand will suffice to prove God with

the whole universe to back it up. It is one thing so to believe; it is another and very different thing to trust God as a Father, to believe in Him as you believe in the banker with whom you deposit your money, or the physician who tells you that the worst is over and that you need fear no more. And it is faith of this order that has an uplifting and redeeming power. You may believe that Christ lived on this planet in the first century; you may master the details of His biography, the motives of His deeds, the purpose of His death. All these beliefs may form a foundation for faith, but they are not faith. Not of them could it be said that they have power to remove mountains. But when you find in Christ the Ideal which flings its spell upon heart and mind, the Inspirer of your conscience, the Strengthener of your will, the Companion of your solitude, the Light of all your seeing—then you exercise faith.

> 'Though Christ a thousand times in Bethlehem be born
> If He's not born in thee, thy soul is all forlorn.'

A cold intellectual belief achieves nothing, has no dynamic quality; whereas what we mean by faith implies a readiness to act, to take a certain risk, to feel the joy of self-surrender, to commit ourselves enthusiastically to One who is holier and mightier than we. Our faith takes hold of Christ as a moral force, as an omnipotent spiritual power, as the will and love of God in direct action on the soul for its redemption. And when we so trust Him, see what happens. An inner world of freedom, peace and hope is created within us. Here we can take refuge amid sorrows and disillusionments of time; here we know ourselves conquerors over all the 'slings and arrows of outrageous fortune'; here all things are transfigured; here we know that we are re-born into a newer and higher realm of light and life. But that is not all. This faith drives us forth into an outer world that we may reshape it to our heart's desire. Indeed, faith is not faith until it completes itself in action. Hence all men of faith are workers. They are always doing things. There is a mystic quality in faith which acts as a tonic. It stimulates all our moral and physical energies and contributes to an all-round efficiency. 'My Father worketh up till now and I work,' said the greatest of all the sons of faith. And in

the ultimate analysis faith is able so to act, because it is the response of the organism which we call the soul to its environment which we call God.

3. Man has the power not only to think and believe; he has the *power to pray*. Faith must express itself or it will die. Now one of its characteristic expressions is prayer; and every sincere prayer reacts upon the faith which it expresses, increasing its vitality and deepening its hold upon spiritual realities. All are agreed that prayer is a great power in life, though men differ as to the mechanism by which the power works. Must we then wait until the problem is solved before we use the power? We do not so act in the ordinary conduct of life. The nature of electricity is an unsolved, perhaps insoluble, riddle. Kelvin, the greatest student of the subject in his time, said that he had not even an inkling of what it looked like in space. But Mr. Edison cares nothing about the mystery of its nature. He sees in it a power to give light and heat, to set in motion a world of machinery, to bear the burdens of our complex civilization. So it is with prayer. We may have this or that theory, or we may have no theory whatever but rest simply in the faith abundantly verified that prayer is a wondrous uplift and stimulus to goodness. Still, when we bring the intellect to bear upon our religion, we will naturally try to form a rational conception of the way in which prayer operates in a world, automatic and mechanical, governed by inviolable law. First of all, we must purge our idea of God of caprice and magic. We cannot believe that God can make anything to happen in the world at any time at the bidding of our prayer. His omnipotence is not that of sheer physical might; it is the omnipotence of love that waits on human freedom and honours human personality. The success of our prayers often depends on the goodwill of others, and this goodwill cannot be coerced by God consistently with His character. The sins and blunders of men limit His activity and prevent the achievement of His will. Nevertheless, no man can pray sincerely without receiving some precious spiritual good in return.

How, then, are we to think of God's relation to humanity in order to have an intelligible conception of prayer? Either we must conceive of God as dwelling in us and of ourselves as

dwelling in Him. Then prayer becomes a stirring into activity through the spirit of him who prays, of the Life-force in which he lives and moves and has his being. Or we may think of God as outside us, with His seat in some distant part of the universe; then, prayer is the projection of our wishes, the flashing of thought from spirit to Spirit, as heat and light are transmitted through the ether. Or we may think of God as the Ruler of the universe at whose command thousands of invisible agents, human and angelic, carry out His will and transmit the answer to those prayers that are in harmony with that will. What if each of these theories represents but an aspect of the truth which may turn out to be in essence much simpler than we suppose?

But our prime necessity is to *live* in spite of all our mental perplexities. The great question for us is: What contribution can prayer make to life? What can it do for us in the struggle for existence? Well, let us first of all appeal to the experts in the spiritual life. Their testimony is unanimous and is confirmed by modern inquiry. They tell us that through prayer they touch the divine. A fire flames within them; a cosmic fountain of spiritual energy is unsealed, and from it they draw inspiration for every task that challenges the will. But these things are true not of great spirits only; they are true in their measure of ordinary men and women. When under the stress of a great emotion, or when facing some terrible crisis, we let our heart go out to God in self-abandonment and trust, the burden is lifted from off the soul, our despondency is lightened, and our courage is renewed. It is as though in the darkness a Voice bids light be, and all is order where chaos and despair reigned before. Of all human tragedies the saddest is a divided personality. We are not at one with ourselves. We are a prey to sins, doubts, fears, indecisions; we are disloyal to our real and fundamental self. The animal man is master for long years, and yet the spiritual man cannot be silenced; and so the years pass in weakness, and to the divine call of our nature which bids us come up hither we pay but languid heed. Then in some moment of self-revelation we cry for a power that will unify the divided self and bring to it peace and healing. Such a power is prayer. For in prayer we not only desire mightily

and lose ourselves and concentrate our thought and surrender our will. It is all that, but it is more than that. It is a solemn act of devotion, of utter consecration to God, whereby our weaker self is put to death and we are at one with the true Source of our being. Then are we conscious of new experiences and events which apart from prayer would not take place. Our powers are enhanced, and we experience a life, triumphant and beautiful, in which God is educating us into conscious fellowship with Himself and leading us to ever fresh revelations of truth and goodness. For in our prayer we seek not to use God for our own purposes, but we wish that He may use us for His purposes.

What, then, is man? We have found the answer to our question. He is no creature of earth and time merely, with faculties adapted to a physical existence. He has spiritual senses, creative powers adapted to another world than this, and his deepest life is swayed and governed by forces that lie beyond his conscious knowledge. In the dim ages of the past man's animal life was evolved, but now evolution has entered on a new phase, the development of the spiritual man. Our goal and the method by which we shall reach it are given us in Christ. 'We see not yet all things put under man, but we see Jesus.' And what do we see in Jesus? A Being who sacrificed everything for love, who staked His all on the mighty venture of faith—faith in God and in man, God's child. He alone is fit to lead humanity to its appointed goal. We are not dealing here with theological dogma, but with historic faith. Christ's life is firmly anchored in the history of the world. We cannot escape Him even if we would. Let us accept the clue to the meaning of life which He offers us. Then shall we pass through an open door to endless progress. Then shall we subdue our passions and quench the fires that burn up the life of the soul. Then shall we yield ourselves to the Father of our spirits as instruments for the making of a new world, a united and joyous human brotherhood. And for this wondrous consummation all we need is the will to think, the will to believe, and the will to pray.

RELIGIOUS TEACHING IN THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS

By M. S. Gotch, M.A.

'We maintain that the future of Christianity is in the hands of those who insist that faith and knowledge must be confronted with each other till they have made up their quarrel.'

W. R. Inge, *Roman Catholic Modernism.*

'There are two intelligible and consistent courses which may be followed with respect to the exercise of private judgment: the course of the Romanist, who interdicts private judgment because of its inevitable inconveniences; and the course of the Protestant, who permits private judgment in spite of its inevitable inconveniences.'

T. B. Macaulay, *Gladstone on Church and State.*

'Of all positions the most fatally suicidal for Protestants to occupy is the assumption, which it is competent for Roman Catholics to hold, but not for them, that beliefs once sanctioned by the Church are sacred, and that to impugn them is not error but crime.'

J. A. Froude, *Criticism and Gospel History.*

'It is a holy thing to see a nation saved by its youth.'

Lord Beaconsfield.

THIS array of quotations is intended to serve a definite purpose. Our problem is implicit in the words of Dean Inge; Macaulay and Froude explain the Protestants' freedom to deal with it; Lord Beaconsfield hints at a solution. Thus we avoid the lengthy re-statement of a too-familiar problem and may proceed without more ado.

Although the present disquieting position with regard to religious matters is causing profound anxiety to all who have at heart the welfare of Church and State, it is felt by most men that they can do little but wait. But meanwhile a host of subsidiary problems is accumulating, some of which are vital and demand instant solution if disaster is to be averted. Chief among these is the question of religious teaching in Boarding Schools and Day Schools. At the risk of being tiresome we must make the situation, and how it has arisen, perfectly clear.

The first difficulty is obvious, and will already be in the mind of every reader. 'What is to be taught?' Let us agree that this question is clearly the direct outcome of the Church's present inability to adapt orthodox formulas to new knowledge,

and there, for the moment, leave the matter. The second difficulty is not obvious; it has struck home to headmasters who base their system of education upon religion, but to very few other men. The blow falls from an unexpected quarter, and the man who has not watched the development of the situation will be utterly disconcerted and bewildered. This is the question: 'Who is to do the teaching?'

Lux a non lucendo, let us elucidate.

The Headmaster considers many applications for posts upon his staff. Let him be asked how many, among their claims to consideration, make any mention at all of religion. He will reply, 'A minority.' Perhaps, by his courtesy, we may be permitted to glance at a few of these applications. What are the wares displayed for our allurement? Science, Mathematics, Modern Languages, History, Classics; Scholarships, Honours Degrees, Diplomas in Teaching, Blues, and Decorations; experience of every sort in the Five Continents and upon the Seven Seas; all these things and very many more we find—the honourable achievements of honourable men; but mention of religion seldom, and express desire to teach religious subjects hardly ever, except in the case of men in Holy Orders; and even these usually prefer their knowledge of the late cut, gamma functions, or the enclitic *De*.

This state of affairs would be remarkably significant even if it were due merely to inadvertence on the part of candidates. It would argue, at least, an amazing indifference to theology among assistant masters, if not among headmasters also. But the actual reason is even more alarming.

During recent years the number of masters who decline to have anything whatever to do with religious teaching has been steadily increasing, and it is impossible for a fair-minded man to withhold his sympathy with their attitude. It seems to them that such teaching, if it is to follow orthodox lines, involves at best the concealment, and at worst the contradiction, of what they believe to be the truth. Some of these men are members of the Church, some are not; some have arrived at this position by working out a practical system of religion, or at least ethics, for themselves, some as the outcome of wide reading and much thought; but in any case the result is the same.

The consequences of the alienation of so many schoolmasters are appalling. In schools which profess old-fashioned but well-tried orthodoxy the very existence of spiritual life is threatened. Such schools fall into two groups: those where orthodoxy is professed but its teaching is ignored; those where orthodoxy is both professed and taught. Let us deal with these groups in turn, always bearing in mind that our conclusions must be qualified by the consideration that Home may have done for the boy what School and Church have failed to do.

Without some foundation in definite religious teaching school services degenerate into a mere formality; the spirit of the boy is untouched, and what should be an act of devotion becomes an act of discipline. In such circumstances religion has little part in the formation of a boy's character, and eventually he is turned adrift into the world an educated pagan.

But is the result of orthodox dogmatic teaching much better? Let us try to capture the boy's point of view. The greater part of his 'Divinity' lesson purports to fall within the domain of History. He has this on the authorty of his own judgment, and it is confirmed by his master. But it soon becomes clear that this is History with a difference. In his History lessons he is accustomed to the master's discussing and comparing sources; stating divergent opinions and adducing the evidence in favour of each; advancing hypotheses, to be rejected, retained, or left as open issues. Moreover, if he asks an intelligent question he expects and receives an intelligent answer. But in his Divinity lessons he finds that he is required to accept, without comment or criticism, statements of alleged fact many of which he naturally considers as insults to his reason; any attempt to exercise his critical faculty is discouraged, and his questions are for the most part ignored or evaded. His intellect remains unsatisfied, gradually his antagonism is aroused, and finally interest fades into indifference. In his opinion 'Divinity' has been tried and found wanting. Apart from any purely literary benefit which he may have received, he is now in the same position as the boy who has had no religious teaching at all, and his subsequent development is as surely pagan.

The remarkable adequacy of the modern method of teaching secular history calls attention to, and exposes, the inadequacy

of methods used in teaching divine history. In fact, not Science, but Scientific History, is in reality the Nemesis stalking the Anglican Church.

So far we have not taken into account a third group of schools: those in which orthodox religion is neither professed nor taught. They vary widely in aim and character, but we need only concern ourselves with those in which religious teaching follows what, for want of a more precise term, we may call 'modernist' lines; and here at least we shall find something to give us immediate comfort, and the promise of a future solution. Many schoolmasters in Boarding Schools and Day Schools are fully alive to the danger of allowing boys to grow up in ignorance of the intellectual onslaughts which have recently been made upon the orthodox position; of these, a few headmasters have taken their courage in their hands and are quietly teaching the advanced theology which they believe to be the only sure defence against the materialism of the day.

What are the fruits of their present experience?

The adoption of the true historical method at once endues the subject with a vigour and vitality which it has not possessed in living memory. Attendance, though not always compulsory, is almost universal. The Headmaster can immediately rely upon the sympathy, advice, and active assistance of the majority of his staff. It is true that positions to which the Church obstinately clings have, of necessity, to be abandoned, but only to make way for known fact resting upon incontrovertible evidence; teacher and taught emerge from a sea of troubles to find themselves upon solid ground.

Most important of all, in the light of the disheartening statistics from Public Schools, it is evident that if they are allowed to enlist on the terms of their new knowledge, many boys are willing and eager to devote their lives to the service of the Church.

All this is matter for intense satisfaction, but we must view the reverse of the medal.

These headmasters go in fear and trembling. They are open to the attacks of parents, governors, and the Church. At present their efforts are individual, lacking in co-ordination, and liable to be undone by their successors. The consciousness of

this last danger is ever with them, for they realise that at any moment their resignations may be required as the price of their convictions.

To secure continuity for the work, and immunity for the man prosecuting the work, is absolutely imperative; and this can only be done by the school's assuming the responsibility which at present rests on the shoulders of the headmaster alone.

Adaptation of existing schools is impossible; one course and one only is open to us, and that is to found a new school.

On the intellectual and spiritual side, the whole inspiration of this school must spring from a liberal and fearless teaching of the Word of God. As a symbol of this on the material side, the Chapel must be the most important and most beautiful of all the school buildings, the real centre of the foundation, round which all traditions and memories would grow. The services, if not actually those of 'the Grey Book,' would breathe the same open spirit of frankness, reverence, and devotion.

The constitution would be that usual in Public Schools. It is neither necessary nor desirable to outline the instrument of government in detail, but the scheme would naturally involve something on the following lines:

(*a*) Governing Body. In the first instance to consist of certain named persons in sympathy with the objects of the foundation. Afterwards, a system of co-option might be adopted, provided that the following bodies were always represented:

1. The University of Oxford.
2. The University of Cambridge.
3. The assistant masters of the school (not by one of themselves).

The Governing Body should have power to control the general finances of the school, and to appoint and dismiss the Headmaster.

(*b*) The Headmaster to have complete power over all the internal arrangements of the school and its several boarding-houses; to have complete power of appointing and dismissing masters and all members of the school staff.

(*c*) Assistant Masters to be paid by the Governing Body, but to be at the disposal of the Headmaster as regards all matters of work and discipline.

The curriculum, terms, holidays, games, etc., would all be such as are usual in existing Public Schools. The boys should be all, or nearly all, boarders; and the assistant masters should be very well paid, and not allowed to undertake any other work without the express permission of the Governing Body.

The locality in which the school should be built need not here be determined, but, having regard to the existing distribution of Public Schools and of other circumstances, the place chosen should be somewhere within the triangle of which Liverpool, Manchester, and Birmingham are the vertices, or at least within easy reach of these three cities.

That the scheme will be welcomed with enthusiasm by a large number of masters in Public Schools and Day Schools is already known. The many men who now feel compelled to stand aloof desire nothing better than to find scope and expression for their religious beliefs. Assured of intellectual honesty, they will at once enter the field.

Nor is there anything to be feared from the boys themselves. It is not widely enough recognized that there exists in most boys a strong instinct for self-sacrifice, which is deliberately fostered by the dual codes of chivalry and monasticism upon which our Public Schools have been built. All masters are familiar with the boy's unselfish loyalty to school, house, form, or team; but at present the Church can seldom be seriously numbered among his loyalties, merely because adequate steps are not taken to ensure that this is so.

It must not be thought that the school's only object will be to send men to the ministry. This it will do; but of equal importance is the sending of men to the messes, wardrooms, and offices of the Empire whose beliefs, purged and tempered in the fires of Science and Scientific History, are the mainspring of their thoughts and actions.

Here, then, lies to hand a great opportunity; probably the greatest since the Reformation. It only remains for those to come forward who, by their influence or wealth, can make the vision a reality.

THE SEXCENTENARY OF WYCLIFFE

By S. C. Wilson, M.A.

THE exact date of the birth of John Wycliffe is unknown. Dean Rashdall places it in 1324, or perhaps in 1325.[1] The present time is therefore as near the six hundredth anniversary of his birth as can be got. Wycliffe made a great gift to his nation, and it is our bounden duty to hold such men in remembrance.

It is unnecessary in dealing with his work to touch on the controversies concerning Wycliffe's younger days as to which colleges he was attached in Oxford, or to disentangle him from another John Wycliffe residing there in his youth. This has been fully dealt with by Dean Rashdall, and again in the still uncompleted *History of the University of Oxford*, by Sir Charles Mallet (Vol. I). The latter writer indeed brings Wycliffe to life again in Oxford.

It is the later years of Wycliffe's life that are the most important, not his work as a great Schoolman, but his public work; roughly, the work of the last ten years of his life,—from 1374 to 1384.

Wycliffe had his forerunners in attacking abuses both in the continent of Europe and in England. In particular he had been influenced by the opinions and work of Richard Ritzralph, Archbishop of Armagh, who attacked the methods of the Friars, and who, leaving Ireland in 1356, preached in London, but died in 1360.

Wycliffe's thought followed the line of Fitzralph's and developed it; he had a strong practical sense, and therefore attempted to put his thoughts into action. From the Schoolman, the writer of powerful arguments in Latin (such as the *De Dominio Divino*), he became the practical—even political—reformer, and lastly an evangelical missionary to the people.

Perhaps he taught by example those who followed him long years afterwards (such men, for instance, as Colet) to put their thoughts into action and their Schoolman's training to some practical use.

[1] *Universities of Europe*, Vol. II.

To bring about the purification of the Church from the wealth and luxurious habits of its clergy, he even allied himself with John of Gaunt, whom he probably met at Bruges in 1374. John of Gaunt opposed the secular power and wealth of the Churchmen, as Wycliffe did, but with an entirely different end in view. Gaunt's aim was to humiliate; Wycliffe's to purify.

In 1378 a question of sanctuary, the violation of which John of Gaunt had supported, told in the balance in favour of the authority of the Church; while as Wycliffe's religious convictions grew stronger and more clearly defined, John of Gaunt deserted him.

From 1378, failing in his efforts for reform through political means, Wycliffe became a religious preacher and a religious reformer. There is a somewhat pathetic sentence in one of Wycliffe's writings, or summaries, where he alludes to that 'frailty of our race':

> 'In that they often attempt great schemes, which through the lack of perseverance they do not perfectly achieve.'[2]

Outside Oxford great Churchmen allied themselves against Wycliffe. In Oxford he had powerful friends and followers; but not powerful enough for the combination against him—the Archbishop, the Bishops, and an unstable King.

By 1382 Wycliffe was driven from Oxford; but his personal power was so great that he retired unmolested to his parsonage of Lutterworth in Leicestershire. Here perhaps his greatest work was done. Besides sending out his poor priests to preach to the country people, he busied himself with his translation of the Bible. In this he was chiefly aided by his 'curate,' John Purvey. The translation of the Vulgate would be a comparatively easy task to Wycliffe. He was a first-rate Latin scholar, and he had so accustomed himself to write in the English vernacular, instead of Latin, that he became the real creator of fine, terse English prose.

Portions of the Bible—as the Psalms—already existed in the vernacular and in Norman French; but a licence was required for the possession of these. The Bible translated under Wycliffe's supervision—and in part by himself—was the whole Bible in the tongue of the people for the first time.

[2] *Fasciculi Zizaniorum*, p. 270, transn.

The Gospels were translated by Wycliffe himself; Nicholas Hereford undertook the larger portion of the Old Testament; while the whole was revised (after Wycliffe's death) by John Purvey. Wycliffe must have bent every fibre to his work. In 1384 he was summoned to Rome. His letter of refusal does not mention illness; but he must already have been ill. In December, 1384, he was struck with paralysis; and he died on the last day of that year.

In a movement such as Wycliffe's, other movements could take cover; and it was precisely of this fact that authority made use to put the movement down. His work would have had more effect had it not been checked by the terrible result of the Peasants' Rising of 1381. This uprising roused the apprehensions of the middle class, and aligned them with the wealthy churchmen in retarding reformation. Yet, as Trevelyan says:

> 'Wycliffe was one of the very few men who could see both the rights of the lords and the wrongs of the peasants.'[3]

The words of *Piers Plowman*, an anti-Wycliffite document, might much more surely rouse the peasant than any extant work of Wycliffe.

But Wycliffe's spirit and work did not die, as many facts which cannot be cited here, testify. His work 'lay hid,' especially, perhaps, in Oxford.

A curious Latin note in a book in University College Library, Oxford, under date 1491, testifies this. It shows that Russell, Bishop of Lincoln, in that year, determined to pick out points from the book of 'Thomas of Walden' that might be used by himself and succeeding assessors to guide them in confuting the followers of Wycliffe, with whom he was 'wearied at Oxford.'[4]

The book of Thomas of Walden, or Thomas Netter of Walden in Essex, the confessor of Henry V, is the main source and authority for the career of John Wycliffe, together with Wycliffe's Latin treatises and vernacular writings.

It seems strange that it is from the book of an enemy that an account of Wycliffe (and his followers) must largely be drawn. Thomas Netter either wrote this book, or gathered to-

[3] *Age of Wycliffe*, p. 202.
[4] Quoted by Dean Rashdall, *op. cit.* II, p. 542.

gether papers for its compilation—*The Bundles of Tares of Master John Wyclif.* From the hand of an opponent it seems the more authentic.

Everyone knows of the survival, under partial suppression, of the followers of Wycliffe; their story can be read in Parliamentary Statutes, not least *De Hæretico Comburendo*, and in such modern books as Trevelyan, Rashdall, and for Scotland, in Calderwood, Lindsay, and McEwan.

Even Erasmus, who in his letters referred to Wycliffe on the eve of the great Reformation, could hardly fail to have discussed Wycliffe with Colet at Oxford.[5]

Shirley, in his preface to the *Fasciculi* (p. xlv.), says:

> 'No friendly hand has left us any, even the slightest, memorial of the life and death of the great reformer. A spare, frail, emaciated frame, a quick temper, a conversation "most innocent," the charm of every rank; such are the scanty but significant fragments we glean of the personal portraiture of one who possessed, as few ever did, the qualities which give men power over their fellows.'

Wycliffe was doubly wonderful in that he was a great scholar, a voluminous writer of abstruse thought in the Latin tongue, and yet was able to bend down and see into and move the hearts and lives of the people.

And such a people as is described to us by Chaucer on the one hand, and the author of *Piers Plowman* on the other; neither of these writers being holders of Wycliffite doctrines; though Langland in his poem unconsciously shows the thirst of the English people for a purer community life.

Wycliffe is typical of the mind of the English race in its strongest and purest form. He stands out as the best type of the Puritan nature, in a series—Wycliffe, Colet, Milton, Colonel Hutchinson, Oliver Cromwell, Bunyan (though unlearned), John Wesley, Charles Kingsley. These men founded on the Bible, that Bible which was Wycliffe's gift to the nation.

Prof. James Gairdner, a writer who minimised Wycliffe's work, calls him an 'ancestor' of the Reformation—rather a poor substitute for his older title, 'The Morning Star of the Reformation.' He was indeed the 'ancestor' of the men here named: and even of such men as Sir David Lyndsay of Scotland.

[5] See references to Wycliffe in his 'Colloquy of the Religious Pilgrimage.'

There is no blank space of time in history. Truth is probably always growing, though slowly. It took a long lifetime for Wycliffe's teaching to affect Scotland, for Scotland was more under the continental system than was England. How did Wycliffism touch Scotland at all?

Partly, no doubt, through Oxford scholars (up to 1410). Partly through Bohemia, in such Wycliffite (or Hussite) messengers as Paul Craw. And again through such wandering men as Murdoch Nisbet, who copied the Testament into the Scots vernacular from Purvey's revision of Wycliffe's Testament (circ. 1520), and studied it in hiding in Ayrshire. Again, such opinions as Wycliffe's show strongly in the writings of Sir David Lyndsay. It is not clear how Lyndsay became so imbued with what was certainly Wycliffism; but his writings show it.

The 'English books' mentioned in the satire, *Kittie's Confession*, were more likely to have been copies of Wycliffite writings than the writings of Luther newly smuggled into this island.

'Quod he, Ken ye na heresie?
I wait nocht quhat that is, quod sche.
Quod he, Hard ye na Inglis bukis?
Quod sche, My maister on thame lukis.
Quod he, The bischop that sall knaw,
For I am sworne, that for to schaw.'

Trevelyan[6] says of Wycliffe's teaching in his attack on the Bishops, that 'it contained the germ of Presbyterianism.' How near does this bring Wycliffe to Scotland.

Nor does the influence of Wycliffe stop short at this island, for it has penetrated the whole Anglo-Saxon race. In America notably there has been a Puritan love of the Bible such as appears, among national characters, in Abraham Lincoln. There is indeed a spiritual kinship in ideas, often appearing in their words, between Abraham Lincoln and John Wycliffe.

[6] *Age of Wycliffe*, p. 80.

A CREED IN HARMONY WITH MODERN THOUGHT

By the Rev. J. C. Hardwick, M.A., B.Sc., author of *Religion and Science from Galileo to Bergson.*

THE English Modernist is charged by some critics with believing too little, and by others with believing too much. It may be a mistake to pay very serious attention to criticism of either sort, but when so distinguished, and usually so sympathetic, a critic as the editor of the *Hibbert Journal* offers it,[1] it deserves careful examination.

Dr. Jacks seems to agree with those who hold that the beliefs of English Modernists err on the side of excess. They are too credulous in supposing that the construction of 'a creed in harmony with modern thought' is a feasible, or indeed possible enterprise in these days. In the first place, there exists no feeling of reciprocity on the part of 'modern thought'; we may desire to be on good terms with it, but it displays no anxiety to be on good terms with us, for 'science is not enamoured of creeds' old or new. Furthermore, 'modern thought,' or even 'science,' is an extensive phrase covering many spheres of knowledge and speculation. We may congratulate ourselves on our friendly relations with some of the sciences (which perhaps do not cross our path very often), but others—notably anthropology, psychology, and history—are less obliging, and are producing results difficult for us to ignore, but yet more difficult for us to assimilate.

Few English Modernists are unaware of these difficulties, and none of them pride themselves that the task they have taken up of trying to present the Christian religion in terms not in conflict with modern thought is easy; nor do they imagine that their own capacities are equal to the task. If ever they tended to display any sort of cocksureness, they have ceased to do so now.

Nor are their ambitions quite so extensive or quite so definite, perhaps, as Dr. Jacks imagines. Few English Modernists would even attempt the task of constructing a new creed—al-

[1] See an article in the *Hibbert* for July, 1925: *A Creed in Harmony with Modern Thought.*

together a hazardous enterprise. What they think is needed is a new theology (by this is not meant an evacuation or 'watering down' of the old theology) rather than a new creed. The ecclesiastical creeds as we have them are themselves *epitomes* of various systems of theology; and when we get the new theology perhaps it may be time to try our hands at a new creed—but even this would not have to pretend to any sort of finality. Many English Modernists are not really very much interested in the manufacture of new creeds. A new bond is rarely preferable to an old one.

This, however, is only by way of a *caveat*, lest it should be supposed that the English Modernist claims to have up his sleeve a solution of every enigma in the sphere of religion. He is aware of a good many of the difficulties without having found any solution for them; but he does not on that account either become a sceptic or a traditionalist—nor yet does he combine both attitudes, a thing very easily done.

Dr. Jacks, though he holds the terrors of anthropology and psychology over our heads, is not very definite with regard to them, but concentrates chiefly on history. Before passing on to deal with the historical problem, however, we shall take leave to observe that the psychological-anthropological scare has been overdone, and has ceased to terrify us. Anthropologists have talked grandiloquently about just getting their guns into position, but now that the stuff has begun to come over we still find our trenches quite habitable. The fact is that though anthropologists have proved that a good many Christian beliefs and practices are far older than Christianity, they have not divested those beliefs and practices of truth, or of value. Rather have they shown how deeply they are implanted in human nature. They have indeed shown us that much in Christianity is 'all too human,' to use Nietzsche's phrase; but it is a question whether, in one sense, religion *can* be too human. After all, it is human beings who have to believe and worship. No doubt there are some philosophers who do not come under that category, but they may have an individual pathway to God which is too steep for the multitude.

As for psychology, no doubt it is possible to interpret religious experience in psychological, or neurological, or even (in extreme cases) in physiological terms. And from one point of

view it is quite legitimate to do so—just as it is useful and legitimate to interpret organic phenomena in terms of physics and chemistry. It is a safe rule that you can interpret anything in terms of anything you like, so long as you remember what you are doing; but as soon as you forget, you become guilty of an imbecility—*i.e.*, of imagining that religion is not more than psychology, or life than physics and chemistry.

Some novelists have discovered that a thrill can be imparted to their banalities by interpreting every emotion, religious or other, in terms of some neurosis; but few people who retain their critical faculties unimpaired can take it all in. Though we desire to be progressive, we hesitate to sacrifice our sense of humour.

For our own part, we are inclined to feel that though psychology has been a good deal overdone since William James set the fashion some seventeen years ago, yet that there is a good positive contribution which it is making to the understanding of our religion—notably to the understanding of the really vital doctrine of grace, which has been overlooked by some liberals, who may have felt no need either for the thing itself or for a theory of it.

Let us reassure Dr. Jacks that anthropology and psychology may yet prove to be handmaids to theology—no humiliating *rôle* to play.

But to pass on to history. Dr. Jacks attempts to excite our alarm in a passage not unworthy of the *Literary Guide*. The most serious difficulties for our belief will arise, he tells us:

> 'From the researches, at present little known to the public, of a widely scattered group of thinkers who are applying their scientific faculties to the critical investigation of the New Testament. It is probable that not more than half of the modern thought that is now proceeding in this department could, by any conceivable exercise of ingenuity, be harmonised with even the least elaborate of the Creeds.'

So that his contention may not be expressed in merely general terms, Dr. Jacks instances the case of M. Loisy, whose works, he complains, unlike those of Dr. Harnack, are not translated into English. Nor do English scholars, such as Dr. Streeter, allude to them when writing works of New Testament criticism.

With regard to the translation complaint (though this is a side issue), it should be remembered that for every person who reads German there are in England twenty who read French.

Most people who read Loisy would prefer him in the original. As for Dr. Streeter's neglect, it is no part of our duty to apologise for that scholar. But there is really no mystery why he and others do not cite Loisy. It is not because they have a difficulty in using his New Testament results, but because they regard his conclusions as critically unsound. Nor is this, let Dr. Jacks be assured, because in their mental ears lingers the sound of church bells.[2]

And we would remind Dr. Jacks that even Loisy remained a Catholic after having reached a most extreme position in New Testament criticism, as any reader of *L'Evangile et l'Eglise* may see for himself—and the work still remains in some ways a remarkable piece of apologetic; as does Tyrrell's *Christianity at the Cross Roads*, which is similarly based; and as does the last chapter of Professor Kirsopp Lake's *Earlier Epistles of St. Paul*, where the author discusses the consequences of the two theories (1) that Christianity is historically a mystery religion, and (2) that the teaching of Jesus was primarily eschatological —and finds them both compatible with faith.

Of course, Loisy has ceased to be a member of the Roman Catholic Church: but it was not he who unchurched himself. Had he been an English Modernist at the beginning, he might have been one still—to the profit of religion and of scholarship. We say of scholarship because his *Acts* seems to betray distinct anti-Roman bias.

Dr. Jacks no doubt feels impatient with Anglican Modernists, who must appear to him unduly cautious and hypnotized by the sound of church bells. What is really wrong with the Anglican Modernist, from Dr. Jacks' point of view, is that he is an institutionalist. If this be a sin, he is unrepentant. The Modernist not only believes in the religion, but he believes in the institution as its vehicle and instrument. We would call Dr. Jacks an idealist had not the term become opprobrious—and we have no desire to be offensive. He is certainly an individualist, and the two weaknesses often cohabit. As a matter of fact, our treasure is in earthen vessels; and, what is still more important, every man has his treasure in other people's vessels. Or, rather, the vessel is common property; we cannot do what we like with

[2] Dr. Jacks picturesquely says of Loisy: 'The sound of church bells mingles no longer with his critical investigations.'

it: and perhaps the treasure is common property too. That is why we have to be so careful not to lose it.

When reading Dr. Jacks we are reminded of Stevenson's parable about the man who went to endless trouble and sacrifice to free his right leg from a galling shackle, only to find when he had done so that it had removed itself to his left leg.

In freeing ourselves from one set of prejudices there is always a danger lest we enslave ourselves to a new set. And as Dr. Jacks has enticed us to enter the psychological labyrinth, we will remind him that the most oppressive prejudices are those of which we ourselves are least aware.

We should not like to suggest that Dr. Jacks is suppressing an irresistible tendency towards orthodoxy. But it almost looks like it, for we are never so unorthodox—or so orthodox—as we think ourselves.[3]

[3] This is a perversion of the saying of Pascal—that none of us is as good, or as bad, as we think ourselves.

BOOK REVIEWS

THOUGHT TRANSFERENCE*

This is an original and suggestive book, the more valuable as being by a doctor, who has had experience in the treatment of nervous complaints, and at the same time is a convinced Christian. The fact of thought transference is accepted by most psychologists, but few have tried to investigate its nature, and fewer still have tried to follow out its corollaries and implications in the realm of spiritual experience.

Dr. Wilson begins with the brain. Nerve energy, he says, is a vibration, and as such has the power of transference from one body to any other which is in tune with it, that is, which gives out vibrations of exactly the same character and rate. There is an obvious analogy to the procedure of wireless telegraphy. If two violins be exactly attuned to one another, a note sounded on the one will call up an answering note on the other. It may be that in the same way the human brain sends out ether vibrations which when controlled and modified by the higher element of our personality constitute a physical vehicle for that type of intercommunication which we call thought. But the influence can be received only by those brains which are in the same key as that of the sender. Dr. Wilson holds that such transference is possible and actual in the case not only of men but of animals: this is a matter on which experiments are much to be desired.

Thought contains a material and a spiritual element. As regards the transference of the latter, some attunement is usual though not perhaps invariable. The reception of influence may be conscious or subconscious; and there is no reason to think that it is confined to those in the body. But the writer is not what is called a spiritualist; he sees clearly the unsatis-

* *Thought Transference.* By J. Stacey Wilson, M.D., F.R.C.P. (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1925. Pp. 160. Price 5/-.

factory character of the supposed revelations which come through a medium. But he is strongly impressed by the evidence for the spiritual influence exercised not only by the present and the absent, but also by the departed.

However, the readers of *The Modern Churchman* will be specially interested to know how Dr. Wilson's results bear upon spiritual religion. A valuable part of his work is a careful analysis of the inward working of the various parts of religious services, the singing of hymns, the prayers, preaching, and the Quaker services of silence. Naturally he is much interested in the way in which the minds of the worshippers act on one another, and the tendency which they show towards a common belief and purpose.

Of course the writer believes in the reality of the divine influence on the spirits of men; but he insists that it is far greater and deeper in the case of those whose minds are attuned by self control and religious aspiration for the reception of spiritual influence. He accepts in a somewhat pragmatist way, and not as a metaphysician, the doctrine of the Divine Personality. But he does not think that the personality of the Power of Evil rests on the same foundation. He would condone the view of those who, reading the Bible literally, believe in a personal Satan, but he prefers the belief that 'the spirit of evil in the world which acts as an external tempter, so far as humanity is concerned, can be regarded as due to the evil thoughts and desires of all those who are harbouring evil, and not an evil existence working evil to mankind from the spiritual world.' This is of course quite in line with Dr. Wilson's view of the wide transmission of thought and impulse. But it would be easy for an objector to take this sentence as it stands, only substituting the word good for evil, and to deny the objective existence of a spiritual Power of good. The question is very difficult. Ordinary Christians now deny the personality of the Devil because they dislike the notion, and affirm the personality of God because it is a comfortable doctrine. But we must dig far deeper than this if we wish to discover the truth.

Dr. Wilson's style and arrangement are clear, and he gives the impression of earnest belief. His picture of the world as full of crossing currents of thought and impulse of a spiritual character amid which we have to swim, and which, in their bearing on us, we have to control, is a stirring one, and it appeals to our spiritual faculties and ambitions. I am the more ready to appreciate it because in many respects it tallies with the views set forth in my recent *Practical Basis of Christian Belief*. Dr. Wilson and I approach the subject from opposite sides, which makes our agreement the more interesting.

The book of course has weak sides, which even a grateful critic is bound to mention. Dr. Wilson tells many stories of thought-transference, and records some experiments. But considering the great results which would come in our view of the world, if his theories were accepted, we should be greatly indebted to him if he would make further experiments, and collect experiences of indubitable authenticity. It is likely that many readers may say, this is a most ingenious and suggestive view, but is the evidence sufficient to support such weight? We have to look to physicians and experimental psychologists for further evidence.

Dr. Wilson is also at his weakest when he deals with Scripture. His concern is far more with modern fact than with historic record; but yet his ignorance or dislike of the generally accepted results of historic criticism of the New Testament is an element of weakness. I should perhaps rather say that a knowledge and reception of those results would enable him to deal more powerfully with the Christian experience. To take a single instance: he observes that the Apostles, all but John, were 'un-

learned and ignorant men.' But that phrase is in *Acts* iv applied to John in particular. Probably Dr. Wilson was thinking of the Fourth Gospel, which obviously was not written by an unlearned and ignorant man. But to suppose that the Fourth Gospel is an unsophisticated record by one of the earliest disciples is to throw the whole early history of Christianity hopelessly out of focus.

P. GARDNER.

ROME AND OURSELVES.*

The Reverend Francis Woodlock, S.J., of Farm Street Church, is one of the leading apologists for Roman Catholicism in England. To his latest apology Mr. G. K. Chesterton contributes a foreword, characteristically paradoxical and wholly superfluous. This is followed naturally by an Author's Introduction. In it, and throughout the eighty-eight pages which follow, Father Woodlock's main object appears to be to emphasize the gulf which separates Modernism from dogmatic Catholicism, and to maintain that the presence of Modernism in any Christian Society will prove to be a permanent and unsurmountable barrier to any reunion with the Christian Church, which of course for Father Woodlock means the Roman Church. He repeats the usual suggestions of priggishness and intellectual arrogance as characteristic of modernists; these are the common charge against all men who, in any department of life, dare to criticise or to depart from the established order, and they can be borne with more than usual equanimity when made by men who are necessarily forced to claim that they believe what they do believe by a gift of Divine grace, and imply that this has not been received, or, having been received, has been rejected, by those who differ from them.

For Father Woodlock, Modernism is vitiated from the outset by one fundamental error. It starts its work of criticism with one or two guiding principles, "'speculative postulates' which it has elevated to the dignity of fundamental laws of critical science; *and these 'speculative postulates' happen to be false.*" The chief of these (Father Woodlock does not mention any others!) and the one responsible for most of the destructive criticism of Modernism is the assumption that miracles are utterly impossible, even to an Almighty God, and that they must be, at once and on principle, eliminated from any record before it can be accepted as serious history (p. 2). This is asserted over and over again in the pages of this book, which devotes a chapter to 'Modernism and Miracle.' It is upon this pre-supposition that 'the whole edifice of unbelief in the Christ of the Creeds rests' (p. 48). Father Woodlock declares his intention to examine the reasons which some Modernists give for their rejection of those manifestations of the supernatural such as he holds mystery and miracle to be. The fulfilment of this intention is interesting. Renan, Harnack, Hume, Huxley, J. S. Mill and others are quoted as illustrating this 'guiding principle' of Modernists; but Father Woodlock does not mention the name, or produce a quotation, from a single English Modernist, whose names he so frequently uses in other connexions, to illustrate his assertion that for Modernists 'miracles are utterly impossible, even to an Almighty God, and that they must be at once and on principle eliminated from any record before it can be accepted as serious history.' The truth is that for the great majority of English Modernists the question is not primarily an *a priori* one at all. Many of them who are unable to accept the miraculous element in the Gos-

* *Modernism and the Christian Church.* By the Rev. F. Woodlock, S.J. (London: Longmans, Green & Co.) Price, 2/6, cloth 3/6 net.

pels would be quite willing to give a general assent to Father Woodlock's arguments, and to agree that the possibility of miracle cannot be excluded *a priori*; they would nevertheless maintain that the balance of probability entirely justifies the non-acceptance of the definite instances of reported miracle and therefore that the general and *a priori* question can be left open to whatever speculative interest attaches to it. The matter can be stated thus. Notwithstanding the immense field of contact with physical nature which has been established by science, and despite much that baffles human understanding, no evidence of the miraculous is found, even though the moral necessity for miracles seems to be infinitely greater than that prevailing when miracles are alleged to have been wrought. If, therefore, it is found that in 999 cases out of 1,000 (and the proportion is ridiculously small) a given clause produces the same effect, and one is asked to believe that on the thousandth occasion the effect was in any way different, it is reasonable to require not only evidence but very strong evidence in favour of it. Nor is it unreasonable to feel that, with regard to such an alleged exception in the distant past, sufficiently good evidence is almost impossible to obtain. Further, the earliest of the Gospel records with which we have to deal was probably not written until some thirty years after the occurences of the events recorded, and in this matter the much-stressed tenacity of Oriental memory is cancelled out by an equally strong love of the marvellous. Finally, when the Gospel records are studied synoptically and chronologically, it is found in a number of cases either that a non-miraculous story in the earliest Gospel assumes a miraculous character in the later Gospels, or else that there is a progressive heightening in the later of a miraculous story in the earliest Gospel. In these circumstances the Modernist feels that certainty that this process was not at work anterior to the earliest Gospel is impossible; but, surveying the problem as a whole, it is more reasonable to withhold than to give his assent to the miraculous stories. He takes this position the more easily because he finds that what is affected by a negative decision is not religion but rather a system of dogmatic theology which is deeply suspect on other and entirely independent grounds. If the Modernist be told that he lacks the grace of faith or has rejected 'the method of faith,' he can only reply that the word faith has here been made synonymous with credulity. Of serious argument bearing on this concrete problem there is scarcely a page in Father Woodlock's book.

Father Woodlock is a controversialist gifted with a power of lucid exposition and with the grace of candour. In reading his pages, one never has a shadow of doubt as to his sincerity, and, violent though the disagreement may be, there is never any excuse for error as to what the disagreement is about. It would be unjust to Father Woodlock to regard this little book as a serious attempt to confute the errors of modernism. It will have no weight at all, except among those who are already prepared to listen to an infallible teacher of whose infallibility they are already persuaded; and the majority of these will not need it. To anyone acquainted with Roman Catholicism and English Modernism the vast differences between them seem scarcely to be a theme requiring any elaboration. Father Woodlock gives many extracts, isolated from their contexts, taken from Modernist writers, and without quoting or indicating the reasoning of which the extracts are often but the tentative conclusions. He is content to state that these depart seriously from the traditional interpretation of the historic creeds, and to stress the fact that 'heresy' is rampant in the Church of England, which makes no attempt to cast it out. We cannot escape the conviction that the audience Father Woodlock really had in mind is a certain section of our

Anglo-Catholic brethren, whether present in Farm Street Church or not. He would desire no greater success for his book than that it should make them feel that the Church of England is not their true or worthy home and so lead them to seek admission to the Church of Rome. His use of Modernist utterances is calculated to create prejudice, and his comments and deductions to arouse alarm, and as a result of this conversions to Romanism may be expected. His sincerity and strong conviction that his Church can say the final word on matters concerning which to be in error is fraught with eternal peril, deprives his methods of the unscrupulous character they would otherwise bear. But they are none the less methods which leave the larger issues untouched, and sooner or later their successes will have to be paid for dearly.

J.S.B.

THE FREEDOM OF THE TEACHER.*

Mr. Campbell Brown in *The Freedom of the Teacher* has much to say that is of interest both to those directly engaged in the work of education and to the more general readers who are anxious to understand some of the problems that beset the schoolmaster. Particularly important is the opening chapter which deals, in broad outline, with the history of education and points out that chivalry and monasticism are the twin sources of much of our present day system. We should like to have seen this idea even more fully worked out. Many pages devoted to the Dalton System might have been cut out to make room for the exposition of this fundamental antagonism between the two sides of man's nature. Papacy and Empire, Church and State, Thinking and Acting, Credenda and Agenda—even Saxon and Norman—the antagonistic claims are ever with us and every one must find some way of reconciliation for himself. To the schoolmaster the problem presents itself in a variety of forms, the most familiar of which is the perennial quarrel between games and work for their share of a boy's time. *'Mens sana in corpore sano'* summed up one phase of the battle, but few schoolmasters would rest content with that maxim now. The aim is higher and the healthy mind and healthy body are both but the means to a nobler end.

Happily things are not so bad in schools nor are schoolmasters quite so pig-headed as readers of Mr. Brown's book might be led to believe, and for that reason his book will be much safer in the hands of the schoolmaster than in those of the general reader because the schoolmaster will know just what to accept and assimilate and what to modify or reject. It is not, for example, mere laziness or wooden conservatism that has prevented the widespread adoption of the Dalton System. There are many good men and true who honestly do not think that the plan is an improvement on the older methods and can support their belief with very sound reasoning.

While we were reading Mr. Brown's book, there were times when we found ourselves continually referring to the title to make sure that it did not read 'The Freedom of the Taught.' It seems to us that all these freedom plans break down because they ignore one basic ingredient in a boy's make-up—love of mischief. It ought not to shock us or surprise us, but whether or no we are shocked or surprised it remains true that while most boys would like to learn things—especially how to *do* things (like speaking French for example)—they are constitutionally incapable of attending to the business in hand without the external aids provided by school discipline. To put the matter quite plainly they must be kept in order and the job will

* *The Freedom of the Teacher.* By W. Campbell Brown. (Selwyn & Blount, Ltd.) 1925. Price, 3/6 net.

need the imposition of an outside and superior will. Nothing is here for tears; it is all perfectly natural and is exactly in accordance with what a very little consideration of the facts would lead us to expect.

This will is the most important part of man: it is his highest faculty and the high development of it distinguishes him from other animals. Therefore it is the last part of him to attain maturity. In early growth it needs the assistance of outside supports which can be gradually removed as the boy grows up. This is precisely what Thomas Arnold saw when he refounded the Public Schools at Rugby, and it is the source and fountain of that Public School system at which—if we mistake him not—Mr. Brown is inclined to sneer. The Public School system was the boldest experiment in granting freedom to boys that has so far been tried by mortal man. Most people thought it was far too bold to succeed and timid people still fight shy of giving so much power to boys, but in spite of timidity and fear on the one side and envious hostility on the other, the Public Schools remain what they have been since Arnold's time—the best that has so far been done in this or any other country.

The framework of every school must be its discipline, and no amount of freedom and self-government will make up for the lack of it. Woe betide the community whatever it be—state or ship or school—when the discipline is weak. Of course rigidity is not necessarily strength, and every schoolmaster knows that the stronger and better his discipline the more liberties he can afford to take, but the boys know all the time that they are being led and that if they do not follow they will be driven. It is time for this truth to be properly emphasized, but Mr. Brown ignores it. He gives us, for example, a very good sketch of the qualities needed by a headmaster: tact, wisdom, judgment, humility and courage, but he leaves out an essential ingredient. The headmaster must be a terror to evil-doers, for, if he is not, half-a-dozen bad boys will be quite enough to ruin the tone of a big school in a couple of terms. The Devil—or someone who does the work very efficiently—still goes about like a roaring lion. The good must be protected from the bad and the bad must be saved from themselves, and this is every bit as true of a school as it is of any other community.

With regard to these things, unless we misjudge him, Mr. Brown is a Gallio, but when he does at last come to discuss the freedom of the teacher he is on much surer ground and the suggestions he makes for liberating the profession from outside interference are worthy of close attention—especially perhaps those which deal with the leaving examination. His plan to make this examination an internal affair seems to us to be a good one. Equally good is the suggestion that the Certificate should make mention of many things that cannot and do not figure in an examination and yet are indicative both of character and attainment. It is pleasing to note that the trend of university policy in late years has been in this direction, but much remains to be done before the Certificate can be regarded as satisfactory either to the school which issues it or to the employer who reads it.

Mr. Brown also pays a well deserved tribute to the Board's Inspectors who do so much to lighten the burden of central control, but he is probably right in suggesting that, small though they are, their powers should be yet further curtailed, especially as regards matters of curriculum.

Schoolmasters will find in *The Freedom of the Teacher* a clear and well written book. They may disagree with some of it, but it will be none the less valuable as a stimulant to thought for it compels the reader to think out his own position on many difficult and debatable points.

R. B. HENDERSON.